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INTRODUCTION 
Venture capital, for all its contributions in promoting our 
entrepreneurial economy,1 is in trouble. The success of venture capital 
depends on the ability of venture capitalists (“VCs”) to exit their 
investments by taking the start-ups they fund public or selling them 
to a large company.2 Initial public offerings (“IPOs”), the gold standard 
in venture capital success, have been decreasing significantly over the 
past decade.3 Sales to larger companies in the industry (trade sales) 
are only a second-best solution, and such sales alone are not sufficient 
to sustain the venture capital model.4 The poor exit markets that VCs 
are now experiencing may be more than a short-term aberration, and 
investors who see the writing on the wall have begun moving their 
money out of venture capital projects.5 Unless a solution to the exit 
problem can be found, venture capital may dry up for countless 
 
 1. See Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, National Venture Capital Association 
Releases Recommendations to Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture Capital Industry (Apr. 29, 
2009), available at http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid 
=427&Itemid=93 (“[I]n 2008 public companies that were once venture-backed accounted for more 
than 12 million U.S. jobs and $2.9 trillion in revenues, which equates to 21 percent of U.S. 
GDP.”). 
 2. For purposes of this Article, I use the term “start-up” to mean any rapid-growth private 
company, which is often technology-driven, that seeks funding from angel investors, venture 
capitalists, or venture lenders with the ultimate goal of exit through an IPO or trade sale. This 
definition encompasses a wide range of companies, from an entrepreneur starting out in his 
garage to a seven-year-old revenue-positive company that employs hundreds of people. The start-
ups discussed in this Article are predominantly in their later stages rather than at their 
inception. 
 3. See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text (offering numerical evidence of the severe 
decline in venture-backed IPOs between 1999 and 2009). 
 4. See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (describing the drawbacks of trade sales 
and the negative repercussions these sales have had on VC performance). 
 5. See infra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the “precipitous drop in investor 
commitments to [the VC] sector”). 
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entrepreneurs. No less than the future of U.S. innovation may hang in 
the balance. 
This Article is the first to explore the emergence of a 
potentially game-changing third exit option in venture capital: 
secondary markets for the sale of individual ownership interests in 
private start-ups and venture capital funds.6 Unlike IPOs and trade 
sales, secondary markets operate at the individual investor level 
rather than at the start-up level. Because investors have different 
liquidity needs, an individual-investor option offers exit to those who 
need it—for example, to the serial entrepreneur who wishes to start 
another venture or to the VC whose fund is about to expire and who 
must return capital to his investors. Secondary buyers who take their 
place will have a fresh exit clock, a discounted purchase price, and the 
opportunity to invest in an asset class that was previously unavailable 
to them and includes some of the world’s most promising companies, 
including Facebook and Twitter. Not only do secondary markets make 
for more efficient outcomes at the individual-investor level, but they 
also lead to more efficient outcomes for start-ups, which will no longer 
be forced into premature, traditional exits to satisfy an individual 
investor’s liquidity needs. Moreover, secondary markets have the 
potential to solve some of the most vexing problems in venture capital, 
including the agency costs that can arise between VCs and 
entrepreneurs—a problem that corporate law has proven ill-equipped 
to handle.7 
As the first examination of the new exit option in venture 
capital, this Article makes two main contributions to the literature. 
First, it describes the secondary markets that are emerging for both 
stock in private start-up companies and limited partnership interests 
in venture capital funds (together, the “VC secondary markets”). 
Gathering information on these markets was difficult due to their 
newness, rapidly evolving nature, and largely unregulated status, 
which means no reporting requirements. Although published 
information on these markets is sparse, several trade publications, 
blog entries, and newspaper stories provided some help. To collect 
 
 6. Scholars have observed that foreign VCs sometimes exit their investments through 
secondary sales. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A Cross-Country Comparison 
of Full and Partial Venture Capital Exits, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 522–24 (2003) (discussing 
secondary sales as among the exit options for Canadian VCs); Carsten Bienz & Uwe Walz, 
Venture Capital Exit Rights 4 (Mar. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140128 (listing partial sales as an exit option for VCs in Germany). 
 7. See infra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (describing the ability of parties who 
exercise control over start-up boards to favor their own class of shares without violating their 
fiduciary duties). 
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more information, I arranged interviews with individuals who have 
inside knowledge of VC secondary markets.8 The interviewees 
included large secondary market buyers, principals at electronic 
marketplaces that facilitate secondary market transactions, and 
lawyers involved in these transactions.9 While my description of VC 
secondary markets remains incomplete, it saves future researchers 
from starting from the same blank slate. 
Moreover, the information that I gathered was sufficient to 
allow me to make a second contribution to the literature—namely, to 
develop a framework for analyzing the economic and legal issues 
presented by VC secondary markets. A complicated system may well 
be evolving; the general framework proposed here serves as a broad-
brush effort to make sense of these markets as they currently exist 
and to contemplate their further development. It reveals that the new 
exit in venture capital is not only vitally important to the future of 
U.S. innovation from a practical perspective, but also a treasure trove 
for academics. VC secondary markets implicate numerous important 
issues in law and economics analysis, including lock-in, agency costs, 
opportunism, information asymmetries, incentive alignment, law-
growth relationships, and the relative merits of market versus legal 
solutions to economic problems. For legal scholars, VC secondary 
markets present a unique factual situation—the possibility of a 
market exit for minority shareholders in start-ups, which are 
essentially closely held corporations. In other closely held 
corporations, minority shareholders must rely on the courts for 
potential relief from majority shareholder oppression. 
This Article is divided into three main parts beyond the 
Introduction. Part I examines the venture capital model using the lens 
of lock-in. While business organizations scholars have debated the 
desirability of entities that lock-in capital, I argue that locking in both 
capital and the investors who contribute it is not beneficial. This more 
 
 8. To entice participation, I promised interviewees anonymity and confidentiality. While it 
would have been preferable to record and produce a transcript of each interview, I concluded that 
arranging the interviews to be confidential and anonymous would lead to more participation and 
more candid conversations—factors essential to understanding these emerging markets. 
Therefore, while I draw on these interviews to help me describe VC secondary markets, direct 
quotes and information resulting from these interviews are recited without citation.  
 9. I conducted full interviews of up to one hour each with six key participants in VC 
secondary markets. I also discussed these markets for shorter lengths with other contacts in 
entrepreneurial finance, most notably angel investors and venture lenders. My main omission 
was failing to interview secondary market sellers to better understand their motivations. On the 
other hand, seller motivation was the issue most often discussed in trade publications; also, I 
concluded that dedicated secondary market buyers, as repeat players, would understand the 
inner workings of the market better than one-time sellers. 
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severe “investor lock-in” creates extreme illiquidity and governance 
problems for investors, which greatly increases the cost of capital for 
firms. I then reveal that investor lock-in is embedded into the venture 
capital model, is getting worse, and correlates with a steep decline in 
investors’ commitment to this sector. Part I sets the stage for the 
argument that follows: that the best solution to the investor lock-in 
problem is the emergence of a market where investors can sell their 
ownership interests. The remainder of the Article applies that idea to 
the venture capital market, where it has not been applied before. 
Part II is the heart of the Article. It describes the VC secondary 
markets that are emerging and develops a framework for 
understanding the major economic problems that they help to solve. 
The story begins with—and focuses on—the “direct” VC secondary 
market, or the market for stock in private start-up companies. Based 
on my interviews, I give my best estimate of market size, the major 
players, and other pertinent information. The discussion then moves 
into the theoretical advantages of the direct market, most notably that 
it increases liquidity for investors, reduces agency costs and thus the 
potential for opportunism in start-up governance, and mitigates VC-
entrepreneur conflicts over traditional exit decisions. I also explain 
how the major potential downside of the direct secondary market—the 
potential to mute high-powered incentives for performance—is 
mitigated in practice. Finally, this Part compares the direct secondary 
market with the “fund” secondary market, or the market for limited 
partnership interests in venture capital funds. The fund market 
shares many attributes with the direct market, but it suffers from a 
unique problem: as the result of high levels of information asymmetry 
about the underlying assets in the fund, fund market buyers demand 
significant discounts. Despite this drawback, the fund market is an 
important new exit option for venture capital fund investors who need 
to rebalance portfolios or sell for other reasons. 
Recognizing that VC secondary markets are quite new and are 
far from achieving a state of equilibrium, Part III looks ahead to how 
these markets might grow to become an even better solution to 
venture capital’s investor lock-in problem. I find that while secondary 
markets may currently be limited by high transaction costs and 
information costs relating to their newness, electronic marketplaces 
are sprouting up to facilitate secondary transactions and, in the 
process, are reducing these problems. Although electronic 
marketplaces will serve to increase secondary market activity, certain 
securities laws, coupled with a particular tax law and standard 
contracting practices in the venture capital industry, will have the 
opposite effect. Although some of these laws may be necessary to 
1b. Ibrahim_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/31/2012 3:23 PM 
6 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1:1 
protect investors, others might warrant an exemption for VC 
secondary market activity in order to encourage the growth of these 
markets. 
I. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF LOCK-IN IN VENTURE CAPITAL 
A. Locking in Capital or Investors?  
Business organizations scholars debate the desirability of 
entities, most notably corporations, that “lock in” capital contributed 
to the enterprise. Capital lock-in means that investors are not free to 
“redeem,” or withdraw, their capital from the entity once it is 
contributed.10 Instead, this capital is a permanent part of the entity’s 
capital structure unless the entity is dissolved.11 The concept of lock-in 
is key to understanding the problems that the venture capital market 
now faces. Before turning to the problem of lock-in in venture capital 
specifically, this Section sets the stage with a general analysis. 
Margaret Blair argues that capital lock-in allows corporations 
to attract investors, managers, and employees by assuring them that 
no investor can withdraw her capital on demand and threaten the 
firm’s stability.12 Indeed, Blair attaches so much importance to this 
feature of the corporate form that she credits it for enabling the 
Industrial Revolution.13 Larry Ribstein is more skeptical of Blair’s 
claims, questioning both the premise that the capital lock-in feature is 
desirable and the concept that the corporate form is necessary to 
achieve it.14 Ribstein observes that, in economic theory, capital lock-in 
increases agency costs by eliminating the threat of capital withdrawal, 
 
 10. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 26 (2004) (“[E]quity investors in corporations generally have no power, on 
their own initiative, to insist that the corporation buy back their shares or distribute corporate 
assets to shareholders.”). 
 11. See id. at 14 (describing the historical conception of capital contributions under which 
“shareholders or ‘members’ could not withdraw their capital unless the enterprise were to be 
formally dissolved”). 
 12. See id. at 43 (“Such a pre-commitment may be important in order for a corporation to 
attract complex, intangible, and firm-specific inputs from other participants in the enterprise, 
such as managers and skilled employees.”). 
 13. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 389 (2003) (arguing that 
restrictions on capital withdrawals were among the features of corporations “that made the 
corporate form so useful in the development of modern industrial economies”).  
 14. See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523, 524–25 
(2006) (noting that the increased costs associated with lock-in and its availability to the 
partnership form call into question the true value of lock-in and its importance to the historical 
development of corporations). 
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which is “an important way to discipline the firm’s managers.”15 Kate 
Litvak similarly disputes the “popular hypotheses arguing that capital 
lock-in is fundamentally a good thing,”16 noting that it increases 
agency costs and the potential for self-dealing.17 
Although there is healthy debate over the desirability of capital 
lock-in, I want to focus on a more extreme situation—one I call 
“investor lock-in.” In my terminology, investor lock-in means not only 
a situation of capital lock-in, but also the absence of a ready market 
where an investor can sell her ownership interests to a third party. 
Therefore, in capital lock-in, investors cannot look to the entity for 
liquidity; in investor lock-in, they cannot look anywhere for liquidity. 
For example, publicly traded corporations exhibit only capital lock-in. 
Shareholders in large public corporations do not have redemption 
rights, but ready markets such as the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) and NASDAQ exist for selling shares to third parties. 
Closely held corporations, on the other hand, suffer from the more 
severe investor lock-in—minority shareholders cannot look to the 
corporation for redemption, and there is no ready market for selling 
shares to third parties. 
Whatever the merits of capital lock-in, the more severe investor 
lock-in is not desirable. First, investor lock-in means extreme 
illiquidity for individual investors.18 Firms that lock in investors will 
see their cost of capital increase, perhaps significantly, and will have 
to sell more equity for less money to compensate investors for the 
extreme illiquidity.19 Second, investor lock-in leads to governance 
problems within the entity. Investors with no right to either withdraw 
capital or sell their ownership interests to third parties have no 
credible means to threaten exit when managers underperform or 
engage in self-dealing. Compare this to the public corporation 
situation of capital lock-in only, where investors can exercise the “Wall 
Street Rule” and sell their shares on the open market. The takeover 
market, in particular, reduces agency costs for public corporation 
investors in ways not available to their closely held corporation 
 
 15. Id. at 527. 
 16. Kate Litvak, Firm Governance as a Determinant of Capital Lock-In 3 (Univ. of Tex. Law 
Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 95, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=915004. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed 
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1977) 
(noting that minority shareholders in close corporations suffer from “a complete loss of 
liquidity”). 
 19. See infra pp. 23 for a numerical illustration of this point. 
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counterparts.20 Therefore, investor lock-in has significant costs from 
both financial and governance perspectives. Even Blair, despite her 
support for capital lock-in, appears to concede the importance of a 
market release valve for individual investors.21 
B. The More Extreme Investor Lock-in in Venture Capital 
The previous Section revealed that, whatever the merits of 
capital lock-in, the more severe investor lock-in is harmful as a 
general matter. This Section asks whether venture capital suffers 
from investor lock-in. 
To answer, we must first open the black box and separate 
“venture capital” into its two distinct relationships. First, investors 
(typically large endowments and pension funds)22 will commit capital 
to a venture capital fund that is organized as a limited partnership.23 
The VC serves as the fund’s general partner and the investors serve as 
the fund’s limited partners (“LPs”).24 Second, the VC will draw down 
the LPs’ committed capital when it finds promising start-ups to invest 








 20. The takeover market for public corporations is thought to be effective at lowering 
agency costs despite well-known limitations, namely the ability of managers to enact roadblocks 
to takeovers. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 206 (2010) (“A problem 
with [takeovers] for addressing corporate agency costs is that corporate agents necessarily have 
some say in how the market for control operates.”). 
 21. Blair, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that public corporations “provide a mechanism for 
locking in the capital used in the enterprise without locking in the investors”) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, taking a historical look, Ribstein states that “even if firms derived significant benefits 
from continuity, lock-in might also have imposed significant costs on owners who could not trade 
their shares.” Ribstein, supra note 14, at 529. 
 22. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-
Ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 158 n.86 (2003) (citing statistics indicating that sixty-six percent of 
venture capital fund investors are endowments and pension funds). 
 23. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 10 (2d ed. 2004) 
(describing the limited partnership as the “dominant organizational form” for venture capital 
funds). 
  24. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–71 (2003) (describing the usual structure of venture 
capital funds). 
  25. The VC supplies only a very small percentage of the fund’s capital. Id. at 1071 (finding 
that a typical VC puts up only one percent of the fund’s capital). 
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  Both the top and bottom halves of the venture capital structure 
exhibit at least capital lock-in. On the top half of the structure, the 
default limited partnership rules would allow the LPs to redeem their 
capital at will,26 but standard limited partnership agreements contract 
around that to provide for capital lock-in over the life of the fund, 
usually ten to twelve years.27 Likewise, on the bottom half of the 
structure, start-ups are typically organized as corporations, with the 
VCs holding preferred shares and entrepreneurs and employees 
holding common shares.28 Because corporate law does not allow 
 
 26. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, at 53 (“Partners can unilaterally dissolve the firm or 
compel the firm to buy them out.”); id. at 60 (limited partnerships retain the general partnership 
rule of “dissolution at will”). 
 27. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 23, at 23 (“Almost all venture and buyout funds are 
designed to be ‘self-liquidating,’ that is, to dissolve after ten or twelve years.”). Mitigating this 
capital lock-in somewhat, LPs pledge their capital up front but contribute it in stages, meaning 
they retain the option of failing to answer future capital calls. See Litvak, supra note 16, at 7 
(“[I]nvestors’ call position in a venture fund is equivalent to having fully invested upfront and 
retaining a put option on the amount on yet-unpaid capital.”); see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, 
at 226 (“[I]nvestors may have significant flexibility to take their investments ‘out’ by refusing to 
follow through with a commitment to put them in.”). On the other hand, fund agreements allow 
VCs to impose severe penalties on noncontributing LPs, including forfeiture of the LP’s entire 
stake in the fund, making walkaway an undesirable means of circumventing capital lock-in. See 
Litvak, supra note 16, at 9 (“Penalty clauses are often written as long lists of various 
punishments, ranging from relatively mild (such as charging interest on delayed contributions) 
to severe (such as forfeiture of the defaulter’s entire stake in the fund).”); Kate Litvak, 
Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and Walkaway Options in Venture Capital 
Partnership Agreements, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 771, 786 (2004) (“[I]ndustry participants are 
aware that choosing a low penalty [for a venture capital fund investor’s refusal to answer a 
capital call] may trigger a ‘race to exit’ [by all fund investors, similar to a bank run].”). 
 28. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 
1740 (1994) (“Typically, the [start-up] corporation will have a complicated stock structure; the 
[VC] and other investors will generally receive preferred stock that is convertible into common; 
the founders and other employees will receive a combination of common stock and stock options 
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redemption at will, the start-up’s corporate form achieves on the 
bottom half of the structure what contract achieves on the top—capital 
lock-in.29 
The more important question is whether venture capital also 
exhibits the problematic investor lock-in, meaning no redemption from 
the entity and no ready market for selling ownership interests to third 
parties. The answer is that venture capital does exhibit investor lock-
in—how much depends on the state of traditional exit markets. 
Because venture capital funds and start-ups are privately held 
entities, there has traditionally been no market where individual 
investors could look for liquidity. Instead, all individual-investor exits 
were derivative of and dependent upon the start-up’s exit. Recall that 
start-ups have successful exits through IPOs or through trade sales to 
larger companies in the industry.30 These traditional exit paths are 





or warrants.”); Fleischer, supra note 22, at 144 n.30 (“The investment by the venture capital fund 
usually takes the form of convertible preferred stock; the entrepreneur takes the common stock, 
often subject to vesting requirements, and also may receive stock options.”). 
 29. VCs sometimes override the default rule by including redemption rights in their 
investment contracts. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 315, 317 (2005) (listing the use of specific contractual provisions as one of three common 
mechanisms by which VCs preserve their ability to exit). But in general, this capital lock-in may 
be beneficial, as it assures LPs, VCs, entrepreneurs, and employees alike that the VC model will 
have time to work—that nascent start-ups which continue to perform can use the LPs’ capital to 
engage in research and development, develop a prototype, and bring their product or service to 
market without the threat of liquidity shocks. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, 
One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 53 (2009) 
(similarly describing a buyout fund as “by its very nature, a long-term proposition” and noting 
that “[p]rivate-equity funds share [the capital] lock-in characteristic with venture capital funds, 
as distinguished from hedge funds, mutual funds, bank deposits, and broker accounts, all of 
which are usually redeemable with shorter notice or even upon demand”). On the other hand, it 
removes one governance tool—the threat of capital withdrawal as a means of disciplining 
managers.  
 30. IPOs move start-ups from the private corporation to public corporation category and 
allow VCs, entrepreneurs, and employees to sell their shares in public markets. When the VC’s 
shares are sold, it returns eighty percent of the profits to LPs, retaining twenty percent as its 
carried compensation. Trade sales allow VCs, entrepreneurs, and employees to sell their shares 
to a single buyer rather than in the public markets, and again all investors gain liquidity. See 
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital 
Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 14 (1999) (empirical finding that most VCs take a carried 
interest of twenty percent). But see Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership 
Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements 3–4 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n Annual 
Meetings, Working Paper No. 61, 2004) (critiquing the Gompers and Lerner study on staleness 
and methodological grounds and concluding from an independent study that “the compensation 
of VCs varies significantly across venture firms”). 
1b. Ibrahim_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/31/2012 3:23 PM 
2012] THE NEW EXIT IN VENTURE CAPITAL 11 
 
Figure 2: Traditional Exits 
 
Because VCs will push for start-ups to exit through IPOs and 
trade sales before their funds expire, investor lock-in does not last 
indefinitely.31 When traditional exit markets are strong, such as the 
IPO market of the late 1990s,32 investor lock-in in venture capital is 
not severe because IPOs happen quickly. When traditional exit 
markets are weak, however, as in recent years, investor lock-in is 
severe. Because investor lock-in in venture capital is directly 
correlated with traditional exit opportunities, the IPO and trade sale 
markets deserve further analysis. 
IPOs are the gold standard in VC success. The Internet boom of 
the late 1990s saw hundreds of VC-backed IPOs (i.e., 273 and 261 in 
1999 and 2000, respectively)33 and mind-boggling returns (e.g., a forty-
two-fold return on investment)34 that increased the cache of investing 
in this sector. But IPO markets have been dramatically worse ever 
 
 31. Conversely, typical close corporations do not have a growth trajectory leading to an IPO 
or trade sale and the liquidity those exits bring. Rather, they are lifestyle businesses run for the 
benefit of their founders, leading to investor lock-in with no end in sight. On the other hand, 
there is a chance for dividends in low-growth small businesses, whereas high-growth start-ups do 
not have free cash for that purpose, instead choosing to spend it on ramping up the business. See 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1205 (noting the lack of 
free cash in most start-up companies). 
  32. See Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO—Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business 
as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2023 n.1 (2002) (describing the IPO market of the late 
1990s as a “hot-issue market” and, similarly, as a “bull market”). 
 33. See Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture 
Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 869 (2004) (citing statistics).  
 34. ANDREW METRICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE OF INNOVATION 89 (2007) (citing 
a forty-two-fold return-on-investment, the “highest reported multiple of all time,” for VC 
Benchmark Capital’s first fund, which contained eBay, whose 1998 IPO returned $2.5 billion to 
the Benchmark fund on a $5 million investment). 
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since.35 One statistic is particularly jarring: the number of venture-
backed IPOs was a meager six in 2008 and only twelve in 2009.36 
Although these dismal numbers can be partially attributed to the 
financial crisis, even the period of 2005 to 2007, a good time for the 
economy at large, saw nowhere near the earlier IPO levels.37 
While IPOs have fallen off dramatically, trade sales continue to 
occur. Still, trade sales have always been a second-best option for U.S. 
start-ups due to their lower returns for investors38 and failure to align 
the incentives of VCs and entrepreneurs.39 An ex ante focus on a trade 
sale exit means that VCs might pass on truly pioneering technologies 
when no industry leader exists to buy the start-up later.40 Indeed, the 
reliance on trade sales has had significant negative repercussions on 
venture capital; when the IPOs of the Internet boom period recently 
dropped out of the ten-year measure of VC performance, average 
 
 35. See PAUL KEDROSKY, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., RIGHT-SIZING THE U.S. 
VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 4 (2009), available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/ 
USVentCap061009r1.pdf (discussing the effect of “shrinking exit markets” as a possible reason 
for the recent deterioration in performance of venture capital); Claire Cain Miller, Venture 
Investment Continues to Shrink, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (July 13, 2009), http://bits.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2009/07/13/venture-investment-continues-to-shrink/ (noting that VCs are suffering 
from a “troubled exit market”). 
 36. News Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture-Backed Exit Market Improves 




=B6OMTpFL5OLRAeCMmYcF&usg=AFQjCNEZUvEyMQNQlZlXD9GlLPXu6TX-9Q; see also 
News Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Venture-Backed IPO Activity at Lowest Level in 
Seven Quarters 1–3 (Oct. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task =doc_download&gid=794&Itemid=93 
(reporting that just five companies went public during the third quarter of 2011). 
 37. There were only fifty-seven VC-backed IPOs in each of 2005 and 2006, and only eighty-
six in 2007. See supra note 36. 
 38. Carsten Bienz & Tore Leite, A Pecking-Order of Venture Capital Exits 2 (CFS Workshop 
on Venture Capital and New Markets at the European Economic Association’s 2004 Annual 
Meeting, Apr. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=916742 (“Both empirical evidence and 
industry ‘gossip’ suggest that there exists a pecking order of exit channels: IPOs normally yield 
higher returns than trade sales.”) (citations omitted). 
 39. See infra notes 104–10 and accompanying text (explaining the divergent incentives and 
underlying motives of VCs and entrepreneurs in the context of IPOs and trade sales).  
 40. See DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, GRANT THORNTON, MARKET STRUCTURE IS CAUSING 
THE IPO CRISIS—AND MORE 7 (2010), available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles//GTCom/Public% 
20companies%20and%20capital%20markets/Files/IPO%20crisis%20-%20June%202010%20-
%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he lack of an IPO market has caused venture capitalists to avoid financing 
some of the more far-reaching and risky ideas that have no obvious Fortune 500 buyer.”). 
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returns plummeted from thirty-four percent to fourteen percent41 
despite a healthy number of trade sales.42 
Therefore, whether investor lock-in is a problem in venture 
capital depends on whether the IPO market will return to its former 
glory. It is tempting to explain away the current weak IPO market as 
a short-term aberration. However, certain structural changes have 
occurred that suggest a long-term problem. First, there is the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), which has been 
widely blamed for making IPOs too expensive for most young tech 
firms.43 Several studies have attempted to measure the increased 
compliance costs from Sarbanes-Oxley that may be leading start-ups 
to forego the public markets.44 Second, according to a white paper by 
the accounting firm Grant Thornton, the IPO crisis began before 
Sarbanes-Oxley and can partially be attributed to certain legislative 
and regulatory changes designed to level the playing field for retail 
investors in the stock market.45 These regulatory changes included the 
“death star of decimalization,” which replaced the former fractional 
system of recording stock spreads in increments of $0.25 per share 
with a system that records spreads of $0.01 per share.46 The 
elimination of the profits for market makers and traders embedded in 
the fractionalization system meant that there was little reason to 
continue covering small-cap stocks; instead, smaller spreads now 
meant a volume business. As Grant Thornton puts it, “[i]n a hyper-
 
 41. Pui-Wing Tam, Venture Funds Sweetening the Terms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2009, at C1 
(finding that the average venture capital fund return “fell to 14% for the 10 years ended June 30 
[2009], down from 34% for the 10 years ended June 30, 2008”).  
 42. Further, there are too few trade sales to keep pace with the number of VC investments 
that require an exit. One commentator states that “U.S. venture capitalists invested in 23,935 
deals between 2001 and 2007, but only 2700 or 11% of venture capital-backed deals had either 
IPO or M&A exits during this time period.” HANS SWILDENS, INDUSTRY VENTURES, VENTURE 
CAPITAL SECONDARY FUNDS—THE THIRD OPTION 2 (2008), available at http://www. 
industryventures.com/pdf/Venture_Capital_Secondaries_White_Paper.pdf (citing Thomson 
Reuters, National Venture Capital Association, and PricewaterhouseCoopers data). 
 43. See KEDROSKY, supra note 35, at 5 (“Some have argued that the cause of poor returns, 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley, is that the IPO window never reopened for early-stage companies, largely 
eliminating the primary source of profitable exits for venture investors.”); Dale A. Oesterle, The 
High Costs of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 369, 370 (2006) (“The higher ongoing costs are a significant bone of contention, particularly 
with the implementation of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”). 
 44. See Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 
229, 252 n.92 (2009) (citing sources on increased compliance costs for public companies post-
Sarbanes-Oxley); Ehud Kamar et al., Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects on Small Firms: What is the 
Evidence? 26 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 
588, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/588 (finding that there is ample 
evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased public firms’ accounting and auditing costs). 
 45. WEILD & KIM, supra note 40, at 4. 
 46. Id. at 11. 
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efficient market, where trading spreaders and commissions are 
approaching zero, the company needs to be large enough to attract 
research and investors.”47 This change has resulted in no coverage for 
most small-cap stocks, including VC-backed start-ups after an IPO. 
Exacerbating the decimalization problem, according to Grant 
Thornton, were certain other rule changes that drove analysts away 
from small-cap stocks, including the Manning Rule, Order Handling 
Rules, and Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure).48 Both these reforms and 
the lingering effects of Sarbanes-Oxley suggest that public markets 
will not be nearly as hospitable a home for future start-ups. 
These negative effects are showing. VCs are now locked into 
their investments for double the time they were a decade ago—from 
an average of three to four years then to more than seven years 
today.49 Entrepreneurs and employees, who run start-ups for several 
years before attracting venture capital, are locked in for even longer. 
Venture capital fund investors see the writing on the wall. With VC 
returns now less than or equal to public-market returns on average, 
but with more risk and illiquidity, it is not surprising to find a 
precipitous drop in investor commitments to this sector. In the second 
quarter of 2009 alone, “just 25 [venture capital] funds raised $1.7 
billion,” which is “the smallest number of funds raising money since 
1996 and the lowest dollar amount committed to venture funds since 
2003.”50 The lack of funding on the top half of the venture capital 
structure means less funding for start-ups on the bottom half of the 
structure. For the start-ups that can still attract venture capital, VCs 
will price the greater illiquidity into their investments and demand 
more equity. All of this could lead to less innovation.51 Consequently, 
the future of venture capital and our entrepreneurial economy could 
 
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. See id. at 13 (discussing each of these rule changes). 
 49. See BASIL PETERS, EARLY EXITS: EXIT STRATEGIES FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND ANGEL 
INVESTORS (BUT MAYBE NOT VENTURE CAPITALISTS) 40 (2009) (graphing the increase in time to 
exit using DowJones VentureSource data); Lynn Cowan, Investment in Early-Stage Firms 
Endures, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at C2 (“[T]he time from purchase to sale may extend to 
seven years, instead of three to five years.”); Dan Burstein & Sam Schwerin, Inside the Growing 
Secondary Market for Venture Capital Assets 6 (Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (finding that the median holding period for a venture capital investment “has 
recently risen to more than seven years, an all-time high…[and] a 40% increase over the median 
of a decade ago”). 
 50. Miller, supra note 35; see also Tam, supra note 41 (citing statistics on the recent decline 
in VC fundraising). 
 51. Claire Cain Miller, With Private Trades, Venture Capital Seeks a New Way Out, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at B9 (quoting David Weild as stating that the poor exit market for 
venture capital “is one of the greatest tragedies of our time” and that “[t]he source of U.S. 
innovation and competitiveness and job creation has been failed by the capital markets”). 
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depend on finding a solution to the exit problem. Otherwise, investor 
lock-in could plague venture capital for years to come. 
II. SECONDARY MARKETS IN VENTURE CAPITAL: DESCRIPTION AND 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
While the previous Part revealed the dire exit situation in 
venture capital, this Part examines a potential solution: the 
emergence of secondary markets where individual investors in start-
ups and venture capital funds can sell their ownership interests even 
before a start-up has its own exit event. This new exit option, a 
potential game changer in venture capital, is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Secondary Market Exits 
 
VC secondary markets offer an important release valve for the 
increasing pressure on traditional exits.52 Moreover, they have the 
potential to solve vexing problems in start-up and venture capital fund 
governance that are present even when traditional exit markets are 
strong. The discussion that follows focuses on the secondary market 
that is emerging on the bottom half of the venture capital structure: 
the market for the stock of private start-ups, known in the industry as 
the “direct” market.53 This Part describes the direct secondary market, 
 
 52. This viewpoint has been stressed by prominent VC Fred Wilson, who opines that 
secondary markets are “badly needed” because “[n]ot everyone can wait until the [start-up] exit 
comes or the IPO market comes back.” Fred Wilson, A Second Market is Emerging, A VC (Apr. 
23, 2009), http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2009/04/a-second-market-is-emerging.html.  
 53. Direct Secondaries, W CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.wcapgroup.com/ 
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explores its main theoretical advantages, and evaluates its main 
theoretical limitation. Finally, the direct secondary market is 
compared with the secondary market that is emerging on the top half 
of the venture capital structure: the market for the sale of LP interests 
in venture capital funds, known in the industry as the “fund” market. 
A. The Secondary Market for Start-up Stock (the Direct Market) 
The direct market for start-up stock is the newer of the VC 
secondary markets, beginning when the dot-com bust left investors 
holding Internet stocks that they could no longer sell through public 
markets.54 In the short time since, it has rapidly expanded to reach 
sales exceeding $1 billion a year.55 As discussed earlier, describing the 
direct secondary market is challenging due to its newness, rapidly 
evolving nature, and largely unregulated status, which means that the 
market is not subject to reporting requirements. As one interviewee 
admitted, the market is still “so young, it’s hard to draw a lot of 
trends.” Trade publications, newspaper stories, blog posts, and hand-
collected data from original interviews with industry participants all 
helped, but the direct market description that follows remains 
incomplete.56 The remainder of this Section offers a snapshot of direct 
market sellers, direct market buyers, and their respective motivations 
for selling and buying. 
Sellers. Most sellers in the direct market are entrepreneurs 
and employees who hold start-up common stock. As the market 
blossoms, however, one interviewee told me that VCs are becoming 
more active sellers of their start-up preferred stock. According to that 
source’s data (which admittedly represents only one slice of this 
market), only a year ago entrepreneurs and employees made up 
seventy percent of the direct market sales by dollar amount and 
ninety percent by transaction volume, with VCs making up the 
 
DirectSecondariesAbout/tabid/73/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (“A direct secondary 
transaction is the sale of a particular investor’s investment in a privately held, operating 
company to a new third-party investor.”).  
 54. See Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 1 (describing the direct secondary market as 
“[o]ne of the newer frontiers of secondary market activity”). 
 55. See SWILDENS, supra note 42, at 3 (citing direct secondary sales of $1.25 billion in 2007, 
up thirty percent from the year before); see also Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 5 (“[I]f 
only two to three percent of the total volume of invested capital were to change hands in 
secondary transactions in a given year (a very modest ‘churn’ factor for most financial markets), 
we can envision a direct secondary market of $6 billion to $12 billion on an annual basis.”). 
 56. For an excellent description of an emerging secondary market for bankruptcy claims, 
see Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 67 (2009). 
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balance. Very recently, however, entrepreneurs and employees were 
selling only fifty percent by dollar amount and seventy percent by 
transaction volume, meaning that VCs are increasingly turning to 
secondary sales for their exit woes.57 Another interviewee, a large 
direct market buyer, told me that half of their deal flow comes from 
entrepreneurs and employees, while the other half comes from large 
financial institutions like Goldman Sachs or Oppenheimer or private 
equity firms who are holding start-up stock “for whatever reason.” 
This buyer purchases forty percent common stock and a good bit of 
preferred stock, diversifying by playing “up and down the capital 
structure.” Interestingly, none of the angel investors or venture 
lenders I asked sold in the direct market, nor did published sources 
mention them as notable direct market sellers. Although it is difficult 
to generalize from these limited data points, my prior work on both 
angels and venture lenders suggests rational reasons for each to 
eschew secondary markets.58 
Sellers’ Motivations. Entrepreneurs, employees, and VCs have 
their own idiosyncratic reasons for selling shares in the direct market. 
VCs will need to fund their other portfolio companies and return cash 
to LPs.59 Employees whose compensation is tied up in options may 
have basic life needs like paying their rent.60 Both entrepreneurs and 
employees may have all their financial and human capital tied up in 
the start-up and wish to diversify.61 “Serial” entrepreneurs may need 
capital to start their next venture. In notable examples like Facebook, 
 
 57. I was unable to independently confirm these figures. 
 58. While VCs need liquidity to return capital to LPs upon fund expiration, angels invest 
their own capital and are therefore not subject to the same “downstream pressure,” allowing 
them to wait longer for traditional exits rather than resort to secondary sales. Darian M. 
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1434–35 
(2008). Moreover, as wealthy ex-entrepreneurs who invest only a small portion of their net worth 
in start-ups, angels do not face the same cash flow or diversification pressures as entrepreneurs 
and employees. Venture lenders similarly have not yet looked to secondary markets, but for 
different reasons. First, their loans to start-ups are of relatively short duration—two to three 
years—and thus not subject to the same investor lock-in concerns that equity investors face. See 
Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 1179. Second, venture debt has never been dependent on the start-
up’s exit event, only on the continued supply of venture capital to repay loans in the meantime. 
Id. at 1184–85. 
 59. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
409, 433 (2008) (“Liquidity is particularly important to venture capital investors because it 
allows them to recycle their capital into other ventures.”); see also Burstein & Schwerin, supra 
note 49, at 9 (corporate VCs “will always be subject to strategy shifts, designed to serve the needs 
of the larger company business plan.”). 
 60. Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 6–7. 
 61. See Sjostrom, supra note 59, at 433 (liquidity “is important to a company founder 
because his ownership stake likely represents a large percentage of his net worth. Selling a 
portion of his holdings allows him to have a more diversified portfolio.”). 
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management’s desire to stay private (for now at least) instead of going 
public, coupled with extremely high valuations, tempt employees and 
other shareholders into selling.62 
Further, entrepreneurs and employees are often able to obtain 
a good sales price. Common stock in start-ups is notoriously difficult to 
value. But one common method is to price it relative to the latest 
preferred stock price. Because common stock does not have all the 
bells and whistles of preferred stock, it will be worth less. Indeed, 
when granting stock options to employees, start-ups usually take the 
position that the stripped-down common stock is worth no more than 
ten percent of the latest preferred price (a ninety percent discount).63 
Conversely, the discounts are far less in direct market transactions. 
One interviewee claimed that a five to twenty percent discount from 
the latest preferred round is standard.64 By way of a quantitative data 
point, Digital Sky Technologies recently bought both preferred and 
common shares of Facebook; it valued the preferred at $10 billion and 
the common at $6.5 billion—only a thirty-five percent discount.65 One 
large buyer told me that his firm’s preferred-to-common discount 
averages seventy-one percent, higher than others but still less than 
standard practice in option pricing. 
The discounts are so low in the direct market because the start-
ups sold there are well-known, later-stage companies like Facebook,66 
 
 62. See Peter Lattman, The Frenzy Over the Shadow Market in Facebook Shares, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 28, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/the-frenzy-over-the-
shadow-market-in-facebook-shares/; see also infra note 66 on Facebook’s significance to the direct 
market. 
 63. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A 
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 900–01 n.86 (2003) 
(noting that the rule-of-thumb “ten-to-one” preferred-to-common discount may actually be 
conservative, and that “[o]ne practitioner reported that 1000-to-1 valuation ratios are sometimes 
used”). On the other hand, it is assumed there is a fair amount of gaming that goes on here, with 
the goal being to keep option value low for tax purposes to help start-ups attract employee talent. 
 64. One interviewee explained that whether the preferred stock’s liquidation and other 
preferences are likely to matter in practice for that particular start-up might also be taken into 
consideration in determining the appropriate preferred-to-common discount. 
 65. See Brad Stone, Facebook Employees and Investors Can Finally Unload Stock, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BOG (July 13, 2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/facebook-employee.s-
and-investors-can-finally-unload-stock/ (describing Digital Sky’s tender offer to purchase up to 
$100 million of Facebook common stock) 
 66. Trading in Facebook stock comprises a large part of the direct market. See Rafe 
Needleman, How to Buy Private Stock Like Facebook, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2009, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/02/tech/real_technology/main5130280.shtml (describing 
a direct market service for selling private company shares); Fred Wilson, When You Are a Public 
Company Without Being Public, A VC (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2009/04/when-
you-are-a-public-company-without-being-public.html (describing the “active secondary market 
for employee shares in Facebook”). According to one interviewee, in March 2010, the median 
direct transaction occurring through one of the main electronic marketplaces was about $1.3 
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LinkedIn,67 and Tesla Motors.68 Thus, the direct market is a “winner’s 
market” for mature start-ups rather than a market for lemons.69 
According to an interviewee, the percentage of a start-up’s stock that 
trades in the direct market increases exponentially each year 
beginning when the start-up is about five years old.70 The sales prices 
fetched in the direct market, coupled with idiosyncratic reasons for 
selling, may explain why sellers would unload winners that may yet 
have a traditional exit. In addition, my interviewees revealed that 
most sellers unload only partial positions, not their entire holdings. 
Selling some stock now provides liquidity while still allowing sellers to 
participate in a later IPO or trade sale. 
Buyers. With no shortage of willing sellers in the direct market, 
attention turns to the buyers. There are at least four large funds 
dedicated to direct market purchases: Industry Ventures,71 
Millennium Technology Value Partners,72 Saints Capital,73 and W 
Capital Partners.74 As the direct market grows, one interviewee tells 
 
million with the highly valued Facebook stock included, but only $250,000 without it. The mean 
numbers at the time were $2.3 million per transaction with Facebook included but only $500,000 
without it. I have been unable to confirm these figures, but if they are in the ballpark, the 
Facebook effect on the direct market is indeed significant. 
 67. See Eric Eldon, LinkedIn, Like Facebook, is Letting Employees Sell Some Stock Early, 
VENTURE BEAT (Aug. 4, 2008), http://venturebeat.com/2008/08/04/linkedin-like-facebook-is-
letting-employees-sell-some-stock-early/ (finding that LinkedIn is letting employees sell up to 
twenty percent of vested stock options on the direct market).  
 68. See Josie Garthwaite, SharesPost CEO: Why Cleantech, More than Web 2.0, Needs a 
Third Exit, EARTH2TECH (July 22, 2009, 3:41 PM), http://www.sharespost.com/press/media/ 
Earth2Tech.7.22.2009.pdf (noting that Tesla Motors stock was traded in SharesPost’s first 
transaction). Tesla Motors has since had a traditional IPO exit. See Lynn Cowan & Matt 
Jarzemsky, Tesla Roars Out of the Garage, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2010, at C3 (“Electric-car 
maker Tesla Motors Inc. generated the second-best initial public offering gain of the year [on 
June 29, 2010], even as the broader market fell sharply.”).  
 69. See Interview by Benjamin F. Kuo with Greg Brogger, CEO, SharesPost (June 17, 
2009), available at http://www.socaltech.com/interview_with_greg_brogger_sharespost/s-
0022276.html [hereinafter Brogger Interview] (“Companies [that SharesPost] has selected are 
those that are the most exciting, and high profile, that people will want to invest in. SharesPost 
does not cater to new start-ups, but to “mature companies, where there are already active, 
secondary markets. They are companies like Facebook, which has shares trading daily, or at 
least on a weekly basis.”). 
 70. This interviewee claims that maybe one percent of the stock will be sold in the 
secondary market in Year 5, two percent in Year 6, four percent in Year 7, eight percent in Year 
8, sixteen percent in Year 9, and so on. Tax considerations may be one reason for this trend. 
Small business sellers who have held their shares for over five years receive favorable tax 
treatment under Internal Revenue Code Section 1202. 26 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006). 
 71. INDUSTRY VENTURES, LLC, http://www.industryventures.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 72. MILLENNIUM TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, http://www.mtvlp.com/index.php (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2011).  
 73. SAINTS VC, http://www.saintsvc.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 74. W CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://www.wcapgroup.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
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me that strategic buyers are also entering the market, but buying 
“only what they know.” Another interviewee tells me that late-stage 
VCs often buy their preferred shares from early stage VCs. This 
interviewee claims that “sixty to seventy percent of [later-stage VC 
financing rounds] have a secondary component to them.” In other 
words, late-stage VCs buy some of their shares from the start-up’s 
treasury and some from existing investors. 
Buyers’ Motivations. Buyers have three primary motivations 
for participating in the direct market. First, it allows them access to 
an asset class previously limited to Silicon Valley insiders. The direct 
market gives buyers access “to the most significant growth companies 
of tomorrow.”75 Second, because it is a market for well-known, later-
stage start-ups, non-VCs may have an easier time evaluating start-up 
quality for themselves. A track record, coupled with the greater 
information available on start-ups that have gained some notoriety, 
reduces one of the main problems in start-up selection: information 
asymmetry.76 Third, direct market buyers, themselves funds with 
investors to answer to, come into start-ups with a fresh exit clock. 
Therefore, while the VC’s fund may be set to expire, forcing it to seek 
even a suboptimal exit, direct market buyers essentially start over in 
waiting for a traditional exit. As long as traditional exits for winning 
companies are simply delayed, rather than gone altogether, direct 
market buyers will reap their spoils. 
B. Benefits of the Direct Market 
With some sense of the direct market in mind, this Section 
constructs a framework for analyzing the main benefits it offers 
participants in venture capital. The direct market’s most obvious 
benefit is that it increases liquidity for start-up investors. While 
improved liquidity is particularly important when traditional exit 
markets are weak, “there are many reasons for investors to participate 
in a more liquid marketplace all the time.”77 Those reasons transcend 
 
 75. SharesPost Launches to Bring Private Company Stock Liquidity to Early Stage 
Investors, BUSINESS WIRE (June 16, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/ 
home/permalink/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20090616005461&newsLang=en [hereinafter 
SharesPost Launches]; see also id. (“The SharesPost community has already seen an increasing 
number of new posts to buy and sell shares of some of today’s most exciting private companies, 
including Facebook, LinkedIn, SolarCity, Tesla Motors, eHarmony, and more.”). 
 76. See Ibrahim, supra note 58, at 1412 (uncertainty involved in a start-up’s first few years 
“provides entrepreneurs with significant informational advantages over venture capitalists and 
increases agency costs by making it more difficult for venture capitalists to sort between good 
and bad entrepreneurs”). 
 77. Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 5. 
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the purely financial and speak to persistent problems in start-up 
governance. As this Section explains, the direct market can improve 
start-up governance by disciplining controlling parties, and it can 
minimize suboptimal start-up exits by providing a release valve for 
individual investors with idiosyncratic liquidity needs. 
1. Increasing Liquidity 
The most obvious benefit of the direct secondary market is that 
it makes start-up stock more liquid.78 The increased liquidity offered 
by the direct market has both ex post benefits for individual investors 
looking to sell and ex ante benefits for nascent start-ups that need 
funding. 
First, assume that investors are already invested in a start-up 
and now need liquidity, but no IPO or trade sale is on the horizon. 
Before the direct market came about, the transaction costs of trying to 
sell noncontrolling interests in private start-ups were prohibitive.79 
Finding a buyer might take substantial effort. In the absence of 
publicly available information, the buyer’s own due diligence would be 
required, and substantial negotiation might ensue over the purchase 
price and other transaction details.80 Further, the information costs 
for buyers would be extremely high. It is difficult for buyers to obtain 
information about companies operating in private, illiquid markets. 
This lack of information limits the class of buyers to those willing to 
perform their own due diligence on sellers. Illiquid markets have no 
mechanism through which new buyers can rely on the market prices 
 
 78. Liquidity has been defined in various ways. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND 
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 394 (2002) ("[L]iquidity is the 
ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want to trade.”); Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities 
Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 285 (2003) (liquidity is the “minimization of trading friction”); 
Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 
321 (2000) (liquidity allows investors “to purchase or sell a particular security quickly and at a 
low transaction cost”); Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The 
Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1007, 1012 (1990) (liquidity is “a market characteristic that assures investors that they can 
promptly purchase or dispose of stock at a price closely related to the market’s best estimate of 
the present value of the future income stream that the stock will generate for investors”).  
 79. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1581, 1583 (2005) (noting that transaction costs are “broadly understood as obstacles to 
efforts voluntarily to shift resources to their most valuable use”). 
 80. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (1993) (“[A] client wishing to protect itself through 
private contracting faces three major sources of transaction costs: search costs, negotiation costs, 
and enforcement costs.”). 
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set by other traders (better known as the “efficient capital markets 
hypothesis” in public markets81). 
The direct market is improving the liquidity of start-up stock 
for locked-in investors by lowering these transaction costs.82 With 
large funds dedicated to direct market purchases, buyers are now 
easier to find. Electronic marketplaces, discussed later, have the 
potential to expand the buyer pool even further.83 At least one of those 
intermediaries, SharesPost, generates research reports on private 
start-ups and publicly posts buy-sell bids for their shares, reducing 
information costs for new buyers who wish to piggyback on the prices 
set by others. As repeat buyers, the large direct market buyers have 
developed form contracts for their purchases, reducing the transaction 
costs in papering sales. Electronic marketplaces also supply forms and 
ease the administrative aspects of sales such as the transfer of funds. 
The direct market is certainly not the NYSE—most start-ups are not 
well-known or far enough along in their development to participate—
but it still improves liquidity for some start-up investors who find 
themselves in a position where it would be advantageous to sell. 
Second, by improving liquidity for individual investors ex post, 
the direct market has the potential to increase the number of start-
ups that will receive VC funding ex ante. A numerical example will 
illustrate the point.84 In a hypothetical world of perfect liquidity, 
assume that VCs are willing to invest in start-ups that will produce an 
expected internal rate of return (“IRR”) of twenty percent. But, like 
corporate bondholders whose bonds are only infrequently traded,85 
 
 81. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovosky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (“The two main determinants of market efficiency are 
share price accuracy and financial liquidity.”); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 18, at 44 
(“Liquidity is thus essential to the efficient allocation of resources in the capital market, and a 
system that freezes allocation at the time of initial investment is inherently inefficient.”); Macey 
& Kanda, supra note 78, at 1014 (“[T]he concept of liquidity is closely linked to the concept of 
market efficiency.”). See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413–16 (1970) (the seminal work on the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554–58 (1984) (discussing market efficiency generally). 
 82. Liquidity is better thought of as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing 
feature. See Choi, supra note 78, at 321 (“The degree of liquidity in a particular market depends 
in part on the volume of the market.”); Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling 
with Open Market Repurchases, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2005) (increasing liquidity means 
“reducing the costs incurred by shareholders in buying and selling [start-up] shares”). 
 83. See infra Part III.A (explaining the role of electronic marketplaces in facilitating market 
growth). 
 84. I am most grateful to Brian Broughman for suggesting this example. 
 85. Finance studies from the corporate bond market reveal that investors price illiquidity 
into their investments. See George Chacko, Liquidity Risk in the Corporate Bond Market 15 
(Jan. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687619 
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VCs will also price in an “illiquidity premium” given the risks of the 
investment. The VC’s illiquidity premium may be quite high, perhaps 
ten percent, given the real concern that the start-up will go belly-up 
and the VC’s shares will turn out to be completely illiquid. Coupling 
the VC’s twenty percent baseline IRR (perfect world) with the 
illiquidity premium of ten percent (real world), VCs will demand an 
IRR of at least thirty percent before investing.86 That is the world as it 
existed before the direct market. 
But now assume that the increased exit opportunities that the 
direct market offers reduce the illiquidity premium by half, to five 
percent. A new class of start-ups—those with expected IRRs between 
twenty-five and thirty percent—are now candidates for VC funding. 
To illustrate, consider two hypothetical firms, Start-up X and Start-up 
Y, operating in either a “low liquidity” or a “medium liquidity” world. 
Start-up X expects to generate a thirty-two percent return on its 
assets, while Start-up Y expects to generate a twenty-seven percent 
return on its assets. Only Start-up X clears the thirty-percent hurdle 
rate in the “low liquidity” world that existed before the direct market; 
Start-up Y will not receive funding in that world. However, both firms 
clear the twenty-five-percent hurdle rate in the “medium liquidity” 
world that now exists with the direct market. The following Table 




















Start-up X 32% 30% Yes 25% Yes 
Start-up Y 27% 30% No 25% Yes 
 
 
(“[L]iquidity risk is clearly an important factor in the pricing of corporate bonds.”); Long Chen et 
al., Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity 1 (Apr. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract495422 (“[F]or the same promised cash flows, less liquid 
bonds will be traded less frequently, have lower prices, and exhibit higher yield spreads.”). 
 86. This thirty percent figure may even be conservative. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture 
Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 72 
(2006) (“Among early-stage venture capitalists, for instance, it is generally assumed that an 
investment portfolio should yield an IRR of approximately 30 to 50 percent. Moreover, because 
many of these investments will ultimately be written off, VC investors commonly make 
individual company investments with the expectation that each will produce a 40 to 50 percent 
projected IRR after accounting for the venture capitalist’s fees and compensation.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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By increasing liquidity for individual investors ex post, the 
direct market should lead to more start-ups being funded ex ante. 
2. Improving Start-up Governance 
Beyond its direct financial benefits, the direct market can be an 
important governance tool for start-up investors. To understand how, 
it is first important to explore a persistent problem in venture 
capital—the allocation of control rights between VCs and 
entrepreneurs. In the early stages of the VCs’ involvement, 
entrepreneurs will typically control the start-up at both the 
shareholder and director levels. This arrangement protects 
entrepreneurs against holdup by the VCs, but in turn it creates high 
agency costs for the VCs by making them vulnerable to 
entrepreneurial opportunism.87 Entrepreneurs may mismanage their 
firms or use their control to extract private benefits, such as high 
salaries, at the VCs’ expense.88 To protect themselves against such 
contingencies, VCs may contract for negative covenants that prevent 
entrepreneurs from taking certain actions without VC consent.89 
These contracts will necessarily be incomplete, however, leaving VCs 
at some risk. 
As the start-up progresses and VCs contribute additional 
capital, the control situation changes. VCs acquire more shares and 
more board seats, and at some point control shifts from entrepreneurs 
to VCs. As Gordon Smith observes, the VCs’ “incremental increases in 
voting power via staged financing . . . are the key to an elegant 
contingent control mechanism embedded in most venture capital 
relationships.”90 Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor have discussed how the 
change in control can lead to the opposite problem that existed at the 
outset: high agency costs for entrepreneurs, who are now vulnerable to 
opportunism by VCs.91 
 
 87. In this setting I use the term “opportunism” broadly to mean not only self-dealing, but 
also managerial incompetence. 
 88. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 989 (2006). 
 89. Smith, supra note 29, at 319 (explaining that in the early stages of their investment, 
VCs “use negative contractual covenants (often called ‘protective provisions’) and liquidation 
rights to limit that ability of entrepreneurs to act opportunistically”). 
 90. Id. at 324. 
 91. Fried & Ganor, supra note 88, at 972 (“The second purpose of this Article is to show that 
common shareholders may be vulnerable to preferred shareholder opportunism when preferred 
shareholders control the board.”); see also Brian J. Broughman, Investor Opportunism and 
Governance in Venture Capital, in VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, 
AND POLICIES 347, 347–48 (Douglas J. Cumming ed., 2009) (discussing situations in which VCs 
may act opportunistically at the expense of entrepreneurs). 
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With control rights residing with either entrepreneurs or VCs, 
one side is always left open to the potential for opportunism by the 
other. Before the direct market, the law was an obvious place to look 
for a solution to the opportunism problem. Fiduciary duties are 
designed for this very purpose. However, fiduciary duties have not 
been able to solve the opportunism problem in start-ups. First, when 
entrepreneurs are in control, fiduciary duties will not provide a 
remedy for oppressed VCs because preferred stock has long had only 
contractual rights, much like debt.92 Should VCs fail to protect 
themselves from an unforeseen contingency in their investment 
contracts, they are out of luck. The failure of a fiduciary remedy for 
VCs was evident in the case of Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams, 
where the Delaware Chancery Court allowed the entrepreneur-
controlled board to pursue a risky strategy that had the potential to 
benefit the common shareholders but was more likely to wipe out the 
little existing value left for the preferred shareholders.93 Second, while 
it might appear that fiduciary duties would be more effective in the 
reverse situation—VC-controlled boards acting opportunistically 
toward common-holding entrepreneurs—that may not be the case. In 
Orban v. Field, the Delaware court allowed VCs to sell the start-up for 
an amount less than their liquidation preference, wiping out the 
common shareholders.94 The combined effect of these cases has led 
Fried and Ganor to describe fiduciary duties in start-ups as “control-
contingent,” meaning that whoever controls the board can effectively 
favor their own class of shares without violating their fiduciary 
duties.95 
Beyond fiduciary duties, a few other constraints on 
opportunistic conduct in start-ups might exist, including reputation 
markets,96 shareholder voting,97 and independent directors who cast 
 
 92. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We 
Should Care About It), 51 BUS. LAW. 443, 444 (1996) (concluding “that the preferred stockholder 
ought not to think of himself or herself as a stockholder at all and should plan to rely exclusively 
on his or her contract as the source of rights”). 
 93. 705 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Del. Ch. 1997). Because VC preferred stock comes with a 
liquidation preference, any residual value in the start-up on dissolution goes to satisfy that 
preference before the common shareholders receive anything. 
 94. No. 12820, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *32 (Apr. 1, 1997) (finding no breach of the duty 
of loyalty to the common shareholders because they had no legal right to receive any portion of 
the sale proceeds). 
 95. Fried & Ganor, supra note 88, at 992–93 (“Together, Equity-Linked and Orban indicate 
that the courts have adopted what we call a ‘control-contingent’ approach to fiduciary duties: The 
identity of those controlling the board affects the content of the board’s duties.”). 
 96. It is unclear to what extent reputational considerations deter opportunistic conduct in 
start-ups. Compare Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of 
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 262–63 (1998) (arguing that 
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tie-breaking votes.98 But with each of these solutions far from perfect, 
the direct market presents a welcome alternative. In public 
corporations, the threat of exit is thought to be an effective constraint 
on opportunism.99 Before the direct market, however, that threat had 
never been credible in the start-up context.100 With the emergence of 
the direct market, that has changed. 
There are several reasons why the threat of a direct market 
exit may work exceptionally well at reducing agency costs in start-ups. 
First, the inputs of the various parties are highly observable in start-
 
close geographic proximity of VCs and entrepreneurs in places like Silicon Valley enhance the 
importance of reputational considerations), with Fried & Ganor, supra note 88, at 1005 
(“[R]eputational considerations may not always prevent VCs from acting in ways that reduce 
aggregate shareholder value.”), and D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the 
Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 174 (1998) (hypothesizing that the 
reputational market in venture capital is informationally inefficient because of lack of central 
location where such information can be traded among entrepreneurs). Smith has since observed 
that the emergence of websites like THE FUNDED, where entrepreneurs post about their 
experience with particular VCs, have some potential to remedy the “no central location” problem 
and consequently enhance the reputation market in this setting. D. Gordon Smith, The Funded, 
THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/08/the-funded.html.  
 97. Shareholder voting is unlikely to be an effective constraint on opportunism in start-ups 
because most actions do not require a shareholder vote, and those that do typically allow the 
preferred to vote with (and overwhelm) the common on an “as-if-converted” basis. Fried & Ganor, 
supra note 88, at 1001–03. California law, on the other hand, does require a class vote, giving 
common shareholders some power to extract value from the preferred on exit. See Brian 
Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 
95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 390 (2010). 
 98. Some scholars assume that independent directors on start-up boards are likely to side 
with VCs, or whichever party has control at the time of the dispute. See Fried & Ganor, supra 
note 88, at 988 (stating that independent directors are “not truly independent of the VCs”); 
Smith, supra note 29, at 327 (noting that independent directors will either be appointed by the 
entrepreneurs or the VCs, depending on who holds more equity at the time). Brian Broughman’s 
recent empirical work suggests that independent directors may be more neutral than previously 
believed and play a true arbitrating role on contentious decisions. Brian Broughman, The Role of 
Independent Directors in VC-Backed Firms 25–31 (Oct. 13, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162372.  
 99. For the seminal law-and-economics work on the how markets can reduce agency costs in 
public corporations, see Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 18, at 43 (“[T]he existing 
business organization regulatory system depends to a far greater extent on competitive market 
restraints than on legal restraints.”); Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: 
Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1995) (“A developed market for shares 
can be an investor's most valued protection, offering liquidity that often is more useful than any 
legal provision.”). 
 100. An important qualification must be made here. VCs have always retained the right to 
“exit” start-ups by declining to continue their staged financing. See Smith, supra note 29, at 316 
(“[T]he credible threat of exit by venture capitalists may work to minimize the temptation toward 
self-dealing by the entrepreneurs who manage venture-backed companies.”). However, this exit, 
like the LP’s right to exit a venture capital fund by refusing to answer future capital calls, 
essentially wipes out the value of the VC’s current shares, making it a suboptimal solution and 
not a fully credible threat. 
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ups. While public shareholders are dispersed, are passive, and suffer 
from information asymmetries about managerial performance, the 
opposite is true in start-ups. Entrepreneurs and VCs are active 
participants in the enterprise and routinely observe each other’s 
performance. Therefore, they are in a better position to observe 
opportunism and threaten exit as a result. They also realize each 
other’s relative importance to the team, which can make the threat of 
exit more credible for highly valued team members. Second, while 
shifting control rights always leave VCs or entrepreneurs vulnerable 
to opportunism from the other, the threat of exit through the direct 
market works no matter who is in control. Whichever party is 
experiencing high agency costs can look to the direct market for an 
out, thus reducing the importance of having control and the precision 
required in drafting investment contracts to address the issue. Third, 
by allowing aggrieved parties to sell their shares, the direct market 
can reduce the transaction costs that would otherwise be incurred in 
ineffective litigation. Now disgruntled shareholders in start-ups can 
turn to the direct market rather than seek a fiduciary remedy in court, 
which the Equity-Linked and Orban cases show has a low probability 
of success. Finally, the impediments to a well-functioning public 
takeover market, such as poison pills, do not appear to pose a problem 
in private start-ups, although rights of first refusal provisions in 
option grants (discussed later) might play a similar role in making 
direct market sales more difficult.101 
3. Mitigating VC-Entrepreneur Conflicts Over Traditional Exits 
The third main benefit of the direct market is to solve another 
vexing problem in venture capital—the fact that traditional exits often 
do not align the incentives of VCs and entrepreneurs. This 
misalignment can produce suboptimal outcomes for individual 
investors that are forced into a premature exit that leaves money on 
the table; it can also lead to suboptimal outcomes at the start-up level. 
As Fried and Ganor observe, “VC-controlled boards may prematurely 
push for liquidation events, such as dissolution or mergers, that hurt 
common shareholders more than they benefit the preferred, thereby 
reducing total shareholder value.”102 
IPOs are not the main problem here. Because IPOs produce 
higher dollar returns and allow VCs to fulfill their implicit contract to 
 
 101. See infra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (discussing rights of first refusal in stock 
option grants). 
 102. Fried & Ganor, supra note 88, at 972. 
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return control to entrepreneurs,103 both parties will generally favor an 
IPO exit. As Paul Gompers has found, however, young VCs trying to 
establish a reputation may “grandstand” by taking start-ups public 
prematurely.104 Thus, there are some circumstances under which VCs 
and entrepreneurs will not be aligned on the timing of IPOs. 
The more common tension, however, arises when the 
traditional exit under consideration is a trade sale. IPOs, even 
premature ones, return entrepreneurs to a position of control, while 
entrepreneurs in acquired start-ups may be replaced or relegated to a 
lesser position within a large organization.105 Therefore, the 
assumption is that entrepreneurs will seek to delay trade sales to 
continue extracting private benefits from running an independent 
start-up.106 Conversely, VCs are assumed to push for trade sales 
because their funds may be expiring, because they need to show LPs 
successful exits for fundraising purposes, or because trade sales are a 
safe way for VCs to recoup their investments through liquidation 
preferences.107 
Under a new account that is emerging from angel investors, 
however, the story is the exact opposite. The new claim is that 
entrepreneurs (and angels) desire even small-dollar trade sales 
because they produce high returns for early investors, but that VCs 
choose to wait for higher-value exits.108 For a trade sale under $30 
million, entrepreneurs might receive a hundred-fold return on 
investment due to purchasing their shares at the start-up’s inception, 
and angels who invest at a slightly higher valuation still make a ten-
 
 103. See Black & Gilson, supra note 96, at 246 (noting that an IPO allows the VC to return 
control of the start-up to the entrepreneur).  
 104. Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 133, 
134 (1996). 
 105. See Thomas Chemmanur et al., The Exit Choices of Entrepreneurial Firms 2 (Mar. 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536024 (“The 
disadvantage of an acquisition is that the entrepreneur is likely to lose his control benefits while 
in an IPO he remains in control of the firm.”). 
 106. See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture 
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 57 (Michael J. 
Whincop ed., 2001) (“Because the entrepreneur reaps private benefits from his involvement with 
the firm . . . he may be unwilling to sell or liquidate the firm, or to step down as CEO where 
doing so is the most financially attractive alternative available to the investor.”); Smith, supra 
note 29, at 318 (“[T]he entrepreneur may receive private benefits from retaining ownership of the 
company that are unrelated to the company’s value.”). 
 107. Cf. Fried & Ganor, supra note 88, at 994 (proposing that VCs may choose “lower-risk, 
lower-value investment strategies” due to their “debt-like cash flow rights”). 
 108. See generally PETERS, supra note 49. My conversations with angel investors have 
revealed that many of them agree with Peters’s assessment of the exit situation. 
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fold return.109 Bringing in VCs changes the picture dramatically, 
however. VCs invest larger dollar amounts at higher valuations, so the 
same $30 million trade sale that paid off handsomely for 
entrepreneurs and angels might fetch only a three- to four-fold return 
for VCs.110 Should every start-up in the VC’s fund produce such a 
return, the VC might meet its IRR target.111 But the ugly truth is that 
most start-ups in the fund will produce no return. Consequently, the 
ones doing well must produce more than a three- to four-fold return to 
make up for the duds. On those fund winners, then, the economics 
cause VCs to pass on the low-dollar trade sales and swing for the 
fences in the hopes of an IPO or larger trade sale later. The effect is to 
lock in entrepreneurs and angels—who would have been perfectly 
happy with the earlier trade sale—for many more years with no 
certainty of a larger return to come. In fact, because of the liquidation 
preferences in VC preferred stock, unless the start-up has a much 
larger exit in the future, entrepreneurs and angels may see nothing 
from the exit. 
Importantly, the direct market has the potential to mitigate 
these conflicts over traditional exits no matter which account of the 
conflict is correct. When VC and entrepreneur incentives are not 
aligned, the direct market provides a solution. The party seeking the 
early exit can sell in the direct market, while the other party can hold 
its shares and wait for the start-up to have a traditional exit. As one 
interviewee told me, “One real advantage of direct market sales is that 
they give a different release valve than selling the whole company. 
They allow the shareholders who want to be shareholders in there at 
all times on a revolving basis.” The direct market not only leads to 
more efficient outcomes at the individual-investor level, but should 
also lead to more efficient outcomes at the start-up level. All current 
investors will be focused on long-term value creation, as opposed to 
the pre-direct market situation, where one party’s liquidity needs 
could force the start-up into a suboptimal exit.112 
 
 109. See id. at 45 (describing an actual exit where angels would have made at least a ten-fold 
return on investment and entrepreneurs a one-hundred-fold return). 
 110. Id. at 38 (“From the VC partner’s perspective, [a three-to-four-fold return] effectively 
guarantees they have failed.”). 
 111. See Bartlett, supra note 86 and accompanying text (asserting that VCs target IRRs of at 
least thirty percent). 
 112. See SharesPost Launches, supra note 75 (“By creating liquidity for shareholders in need 
of an exit, SharesPost reduces the pressure on company management to accept a sub-optimal but 
immediate ‘liquidity event.’ ”). 
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C. The Direct Market’s Potential to Mute High-Powered Incentives 
The preceding discussion explored the three main benefits of 
the direct market: increasing liquidity, improving start-up 
governance, and mitigating VC-entrepreneur conflicts over traditional 
exits. The direct market does, however, also present a potentially 
significant downside: the muting of high-powered performance 
incentives that are embedded in the venture capital structure. As 
Albert Hirschman has explained, when it comes to organizational 
behavior, there is a tradeoff between the ability to exit and the 
incentive to exercise voice.113 The more difficult it is to exit, the more 
incentive there is to exercise voice, and vice versa. 
Before the direct market offered individual start-up investors 
the opportunity to exit—which was the only way for them to obtain 
liquidity—they were highly motivated to exercise voice. Fund 
investors incentivize VCs to perform by placing time limits on current 
funds and dangling capital for future funds. VCs, in turn, perform by 
monitoring start-ups and contributing value-added services.114 
Likewise, VCs instill high-powered performance incentives in 
entrepreneurs and employees by compensating them with start-up 
stock and stock options.115 Before the direct market, appreciation in 
this equity could only be realized if the start-up achieved a traditional 
exit, causing entrepreneurs and employees to work diligently for start-
up success. 
By unraveling the ties that bind liquidity and traditional exits, 
the direct market has the potential to make these performance 
incentives less important. By permitting exits on an individual-
investor level, the direct market can upset carefully structured 
arrangements that lead to start-up success. Should VCs sell their 
shares in the direct market, they would no longer have incentives to 
monitor entrepreneurs or contribute value-added services. Should 
 
 113. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 114–15 (1970); see also John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit 
Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE 
L.J. 84, 89 (2010) (“[Easy] exit almost completely eliminates mutual fund investors’ incentives to 
use fee liability, voting, and boards of directors.”). 
 114. See Bienz & Walz, supra note 6, at 8 (“More illiquidity increases the incentive of the 
active monitor (the VC) to pursue his task.”). 
 115. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 23, at 131 (“Managers and critical employees within a 
[start-up] firm receive a substantial fraction of their compensation in the form of equity or 
options. This tends to align the incentives of managers and investors.”); Gilson & Schizer, supra 
note 63, at 880 (“An overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation depends on firm 
performance. The potential for dramatic appreciation in the value of stock and options thus 
offsets low salaries.”). 
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entrepreneurs sell their shares, they would no longer share in the 
equity upside of a traditional exit, and therefore would be less 
motivated to put in the long hours necessary to achieve it. Indeed, 
they may have no desire to continue working at the start-up at all.116 
In short, by making exit easier, the direct market has the potential to 
leave less incentive for start-up participants to exercise voice. 
Although these are serious concerns, there are several ways in 
which they are mitigated in practice. First, interviewees told me that 
many entrepreneurs and employees who sell in the direct market no 
longer work at the start-up, such as “forgotten founders.”117 Those 
individuals who have moved on are no longer exercising voice over 
start-up affairs with or without the direct market. Second, 
interviewees revealed that entrepreneurs and employees who still 
work at start-ups—the ones whose performance is a concern—will sell 
only partial positions in the direct market, not their full ownership 
interest. One reason for selling only some shares instead of the full 
allotment is to be able to participate in the upside of a traditional exit 
down the road.118 Another reason for partial sales is that stock options 
vest in stages, and securities laws require sellers to hold vested 
options for a least one year prior to selling.119 This means that it is not 
possible to sell a full allotment even for those who desire to. Finally, 
interviewees reveal that VCs too sell only partial positions. When they 
sell to other VCs, the transaction functions as a kind of ex post 
syndication arrangement. Reputation constraints should cause VCs to 
seek high-caliber replacements that might bring a different set of 
value-added services to the table, such as a financial services 
orientation.120 
 
 116. OLSONOMICS, http://www.ericjohnolson.com/blog/2009/04/23/secondary-markets-for-
private-company-stock-whats-happening-and-what-are-the-issues/ (Apr. 23, 2009, 11:35) (“Part 
of the stability of startups lies in the fact that everyone is in it together for the long term. . . . If 
founders, investors, board members and employees can suddenly liquidate their stock fairly 
easily what is left to keep them around?”). But see Needleman, supra note 66 (quoting 
SharesPost CEO Greg Brogger as stating that incentives to work for traditional exits are “now 
largely moot, since those transactions aren’t happening in this economy”). 
 117. A “forgotten founder” is someone who was with the start-up at the outset, no longer 
works there, but retains a potentially significant ownership interest. 
 118. See Brogger Interview, supra note 69 (“[Sellers] are not necessarily looking to sell all of 
their position in a company, but want some amount of liquidity for their shares.”). 
 119. See infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 144’s one-year holding 
period).  
 120. For example, one large direct market buyer told me that his firm provided value-added 
financial services, such as reorganizing capital structures to make the start-up a more attractive 
IPO candidate and discussing with start-up management any concerns found during the buyer’s 
due diligence review. See Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 7 (“Secondary transactions can 
also work well as tools to streamline capital structures prior to an IPO by buying the interests of 
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For all of these reasons, the direct market does not mute high-
powered performance incentives to the degree it might first appear. 
Start-up participants have increased opportunities for individual 
exits, which have the benefits previously explained, but are still 
motivated to exercise voice and help the start-up achieve a traditional 
exit. 
D. Comparing the Direct Market with the Market for Limited 
Partnership Interests in Venture Capital Funds (the Fund Market) 
This Section turns to the top half of the venture capital 
structure: the market for limited partnership interests in venture 
capital funds, known in the industry as the “fund” market. The fund 
market is about a decade older than the direct market,121 but its real 
growth coincided with the emergence of the direct market in the last 
ten years.122 In the aggregate, the fund market appears to be roughly 
the same size as the direct market, with over $1 billion in LP interests 
resold per year.123 The fund market is also private, still evolving, and 
 
smaller shareholders and rendering the cap table more efficient in the eyes of underwriters and 
institutional investors.”). 
 121. See Brett Byers, Secondary Sales of Private Equity Interests, ALTASSETS KNOWLEDGE 
BANK (Feb. 18, 2002), http://www.altassets.com/private-equity-knowledge-bank/industry-focus/ 
article/nz3269.html (“Dayton Carr and Arnaud Isnard of Venture Capital Fund of America 
(VCFA) raised the first private equity fund in 1986 to purchase private equity interests . . . on a 
secondary basis from investors needing liquidity.”); Firm, LEXINGTON PARTNERS, 
http://www.lexingtonpartners.com/#/firm/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (“Principals of Lexington 
Partners pioneered the development of the secondary market for private equity interests more 
than 20 years ago.”). 
 122. See Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 1 (“The leading secondary funds in 2008 . . . 
with billions of dollars dedicated to secondary investing, are now bigger than the leading primary 
private equity funds of the 1990s.”). 
 123. See Limited Partnership Secondary Transactions Volume, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 
(Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.pionline.com/article/20100112/CHARTOFDAY/100119971. NYPPEX, 
the source of these figures, tracks secondary sales of LP interests in all alternative asset classes, 
including venture capital funds, buyout funds, and hedge funds. Institutions typically devote ten 
percent of their investment portfolios to these alternative asset classes. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. 
CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 72–73 (2009) (“Institutional investors rarely commit more than 10% of their 
investment portfolio to private equity funds” because of the perceived risk of such investments); 
Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 264 (2009) (“[P]ricing rules have generally led mutual funds to invest 
only in publicly-traded liquid securities and to avoid illiquid assets such as venture capital, 
private equity, or restricted shares of public companies. Recognizing the difficulties of valuing 
illiquid securities, the SEC has recommended that funds limit investment in illiquid assets to no 
more than 10% to 15% of fund assets.”); id. at 267 n.85 (discussing how New York’s pension 
funds allocate up to fifteen percent to “prudent alternative companies”). Then, at least according 
to the rule of thumb I have heard (though I do not have empirical support for this), they devote 
ten percent of that figure to venture capital. Therefore, to estimate fund market sales for venture 
capital alone, the NYPPEX figures were multiplied by ten percent. 
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therefore difficult to describe. Original interviews and trade 
publications again helped with the task. The remainder of this Section 
compares the fund market with the direct market. It begins by 
exploring fund market sellers and their motivations for selling, moves 
on to buyers and their motivations for buying, and concludes by 
applying the same theoretical framework developed for the direct 
market to the fund market to explore its main benefits and 
drawbacks. 
Sellers and Their Motivations. While direct market sellers 
include entrepreneurs, employees, and VCs, fund market sellers 
consist mostly of the large endowments, pension funds, and other 
institutions that invest in venture capital funds.124 The common 
reason why these institutions sell in the fund market appears to be to 
rebalance their portfolios.125 Because endowments and pension funds 
typically devote only ten percent of their portfolios to alternative 
assets, including venture capital, events such as the financial crisis 
that devastate traditional investments result in alternative asset 
values exceeding ten percent. LPs in this position will sell to bring 
alternative assets back down to ten percent. Another motivation for 
fund market sales is to transfer future capital call obligations from 
cash-strapped sellers to fund market buyers.126 Fund market sales can 
also lock in tax losses on losing investments to offset gains on 
profitable ones. 
Buyers and Their Motivations. As in the direct market, fund 
market buyers include both funds dedicated to these transactions and 
opportunistic buyers. The dedicated funds purchase LP interests in 
not only venture capital, but also buyout funds, hedge funds, and 
other private equity. They include Coller Capital,127 HarbourVest 
 
 124. See Fleischer, supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Catherine Craig, Five Buy 
Record $3bn CALPERS Portfolio, FIN. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/ 
2008-02-05/five-buy-record-calpers-portfolio-2 (describing CALPERS’ sale of $3 billion in private 
equity fund interests, including LP interests in venture capital funds, as “the largest secondaries 
fund divestment of its kind”).  
 125. See Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 3 (explaining that LPs’ motivations for 
selling in the fund market include “[r]ebalancing and diversifying portfolio allocations or 
relieving the concentration of value/net worth”). According to Sebastien Burdel, investment 
principal at fund market buyer Coller Capital, “surveyed LPs rank portfolio management ahead 
of liquidity needs as the key reason why they would sell in the secondary market.” Private Equity 
Secondary Funds: Are They Players or Opportunistic Investors?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Aug. 5, 
2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/mobile/article.cfm?articleid=2302&page=2 
[hereinafter Players or Opportunistic Investors?]. 
 126. See Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that fund market sales have the 
benefit of “[a]lleviating the need [for LPs] to allocate follow-on capital for existing investments”). 
 127. COLLER CAPITAL, http://www.collercapital.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
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Partners,128 Lexington Partners,129 Pantheon Ventures,130 and Paul 
Capital.131 According to my interviews, these buyers are motivated 
less by the opportunity to own the underlying interests in any one 
start-up than by the steep discounts that they can expect when buying 
an LP’s entire portfolio. While direct market buyers can cherry pick 
winning start-ups on which information is available, fund market 
buyers must take an LP’s entire bundle of uncertain assets.132 Because 
buyers cannot adequately evaluate the assets that they are buying, 
they assume the worst and discount the entire portfolio accordingly.133 
The bundle approach leads to discounts of at least fifty percent and 
perhaps sixty to ninety percent, as seen at the peak of the financial 
crisis.134 Consequently, while the direct market is a seller’s market 
where the owners of Facebook and LinkedIn go to sell, the fund 
market is a buyer’s market, which for sellers may be only the “best of 
several bad alternatives.”135 
Theoretical Framework. The theoretical framework constructed 
for the direct market largely maps onto the fund market as well. 
Recall that at the start-up level, the direct market increases liquidity, 
improves start-up governance, and mitigates VC-entrepreneur 
conflicts over traditional exits. On the downside, the direct market 
threatens to mute high-powered incentives for performance embedded 
in the venture capital structure, but these concerns are mitigated in 
 
 128. HARBOURVEST, http://www.harbourvest.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 129. LEXINGTON PARTNERS, http://www.lexingtonpartners.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 130. PANTHEON, http://www.pantheonventures.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 131. PAUL CAPITAL, http://www.paulcap.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).  
 132. As one interviewee put it, “fund market buyers have to take the bundle of 10–20 
companies, where buyers in the direct market cherry pick the best ones.” 
 133. One interviewee was not so charitable, describing fund market buyers as “vulture 
funds” who are “waiting on LPs to default and then buying [their interests] for cents on the 
dollar.” 
 134. See Anne E. Ross et al., Secondary Trading of Limited Partnership Interests in Private 
Equity Funds—Recent Developments, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 1 (July 2009), 
http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=6155 (noting that discounts in the fund market “have 
been reported to be as high as 50 to 70 percent”); id. at 2 (“[T]he parties typically fix a ‘cut-off 
date’ as of a recent net asset value (NAV) determination. The parties then negotiate a premium 
or discount to NAV as of the cut-off-date. In this market, except in very rare circumstances, the 
purchase price will likely be a discount to NAV.”); Gillian Wee, Stanford Said to Offer Sequoia 
Stakes in Fund Sale (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aRqnoF6eud_w (noting that fund market prices were “as low as 10 
cents to 40 cents on the dollar” in early 2009, and median bid had rebounded to “52 cents on the 
dollar in the September [2009] quarter”). 
 135. Ross et al., supra note 134, at 1; id. (stating that the fund market is “a ‘buyers’ market’ 
in which institutional investors and new funds of funds with access to capital have the 
opportunity to buy private equity fund limited partnership interests in the secondary market at 
discounts from face value”). 
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practice. The fund market has a slightly different drawback than the 
direct market, but very similar advantages. 
First, like the direct market, the fund market increases 
liquidity for LPs. This not only provides a release valve for already 
committed investors ex post, but also increases the amount of capital 
that VCs are able to raise ex ante.136 Second, the fund market is an 
important tool for improving venture capital fund performance 
because it can reduce LPs’ agency costs with VCs. Before the fund 
market, LPs reduced agency costs with VCs by limiting fund duration 
and making a large portion of VC compensation dependent on 
performance.137 Unlike in start-ups, however, LPs never had the 
opportunity to exercise voice over fund governance because 
partnership law strips them of their limited liability status should 
they do so.138 Thus, before the fund market, LPs were left with no 
voice and no exit. The fund market now allows for exit and, as a 
result, can improve fund governance by disciplining VCs.139 Third, 
while VCs and entrepreneurs may have misaligned incentives over 
traditional exits at the start-up level, VCs’ and LPs’ incentives are 
aligned over all types of traditional exits at the fund level. Both want 
exits within the fund’s set time limit that are as large as possible, and 
neither delays traditional exits to extract private benefits the way 
entrepreneurs might. Finally, while the main potential downside of 
the direct market is to mute the high-powered performance incentives 
embedded in the venture capital structure, the fund market structure 
contains no embedded performance incentives for LPs. As noted, LPs 
are by law passive investors whose only contribution to the success of 
the fund is financial capital. In sum, the fund market seems to have 
all of the benefits of the direct market with a different drawback: low 
sale prices for sellers. 
 
 136. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text for a numerical example illustrating this 
point at the start-up level. 
 137. Gilson, supra note 24, at 1090 (“The venture capital fund’s fixed term, together with the 
operation of the reputation market, responds to this agency cost problem.”); id. at 1089 (“[In 
venture capital], the bulk of the GP’s compensation comes in the form of a carried interest . . . 
distributed to the general partner when realized profits are distributed to the limited partners. 
Thus, the compensation structure aligns the GP’s interests in the fund’s success with those of the 
investors.”). 
 138. Id. at 1088 (“[T]he legal rules governing limited partnerships prevent investors from 
exercising control over the central elements of the venture capital fund’s business. Most 
important, the investors are prohibited from insisting on an approval right of the GP’s 
investment decisions.”). 
 139. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 29, at 53–54, 72 (similarly arguing that “the 
creation of a robust secondary market in private-equity investments” is a good solution to the 
agency cost problem between LPs and GPs in buyout funds and that a “well-functioning market 
solution is clearly preferable to the vagaries of judicial process”). 
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III. THE FUTURE OF SECONDARY MARKETS IN VENTURE CAPITAL 
The previous Part focused on VC secondary markets as they 
currently exist. However, these markets are still in their infancy and 
must continue to develop for their benefits to be fully realized.140 With 
the newness of VC secondary markets in mind, this Part looks to the 
future and identifies the main factors that will likely influence their 
development. The discussion explores factors that will both further 
and hinder market growth. It begins by explaining how electronic 
exchanges are being developed to facilitate direct and fund market 
transactions and thus move secondary activity from isolated 
transactions to true markets. It then turns to certain securities laws, a 
tax law, and standard contracting practices in venture capital that 
could provide a countervailing force to electronic marketplaces and 
actually hinder market growth. Once again, the focus is on the direct 
market, with much of the discussion equally applicable to the fund 
market. 
A. The Role of Electronic Marketplaces in Facilitating Growth 
In 2009, VC secondary markets got a significant boost. Two 
electronic marketplaces, SharesPost and SecondMarket, launched as 
platforms for intermediating secondary market transactions. 
SharesPost was founded by Greg Brogger,141 a former entrepreneur 
and Wilson Sonsini securities lawyer, and focuses entirely on direct 
market transactions. SharesPost is structured as an online bulletin 
board where potential buyers and sellers post buy and sell bids for 
shares in the world’s leading start-ups. According to the Wall Street 
Journal, in its first three months of operation, SharesPost attracted 
“7,000 registered users” and hosted “more than $1 million in private 
company share transactions.”142 
SecondMarket also launched its venture capital operations in 
2009, although it has been facilitating secondary sales in bankruptcy 
claims and other illiquid assets for longer.143 Within venture capital, 
 
 140. Id. at 54 (noting that secondary markets in private equity “may yet be years away from 
providing sufficient liquidity to mitigate agency costs significantly in this environment”). 
 141. About Us, SHARESPOST, http://www.sharespost.com/pages/about (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011).  
 142. Pui-Wing Tam, SharesPost Ramps Up, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG, (Sept. 3, 2009, 6:00 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/09/03/sharespost-ramps-up/. 
 143. SECONDMARKET, http://www.secondmarket.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
SecondMarket began under the name Restricted Stock Partners. See Miller, supra note 51 
(“[SecondMarket] operates seven other markets for illiquid assets, including ones for restricted 
public equities and bankruptcy claims.”). 
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SecondMarket intermediates transactions in both the direct and fund 
markets.144 While SharesPost’s status as a passive bulletin board 
limits the amount of hands-on intermediation it may do, 
SecondMarket is structured as a broker-dealer and therefore provides 
more active assistance to buyers and sellers.145 
SharesPost and SecondMarket increase liquidity for individual 
investors in several ways. Recall that sales of private company stock 
are often plagued by high transaction costs and information costs, 
including difficulties matching buyers and sellers, a lack of 
information requiring extensive due diligence, and the costs of 
negotiating and papering transactions. VC secondary markets, despite 
improving upon the prior state of affairs, still suffer from these 
problems. Savvy sellers may be able to find the major funds dedicated 
to secondary purchases, but other opportunistic or nondedicated 
buyers will remain elusive. Further, direct market buyers who have 
identified a start-up of interest will not know which of its 
entrepreneurs, employees, or VCs is interested in selling. Thus, the 
transaction costs of matching buyers and sellers may prevent a would-
be transaction. In instances where parties are able to connect, buyers 
will have to perform due diligence, and both parties will have to 
negotiate price, find securities law exemptions for resale, navigate 
contractual restrictions on sales, and draw up sale documents. 
While transaction costs and information costs will be high in 
isolated transactions, SharesPost and SecondMarket now offer a 
“central location for trading,” something commonly associated with 
our very notions of a market.146 By offering a central site, SharesPost 
and SecondMarket make it easier for buyers and sellers to find one 
another. Rather than Twitter employees having to approach dedicated 
 
 144. According to an interviewee, SecondMarket launched its direct market operations in 
April 2009 and its fund market operations a few months earlier, in January 2009. While I know 
of no other electronic marketplaces operating in the direct market, many operate in the fund 
market, such as the PORTAL Alliance operated by NASDAQ and NYPPEX. See Birdthistle & 
Henderson, supra note 29, at 76–77 (noting that NYPPEX “hosts over $10 billion secondary 
market in private-equity interests”); Elena Schwieger, Comment, Redefining the Private 
Placement Market After Sarbanes-Oxley: NASDAQ’s PORTAL and Rule 144A, 57 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 885, 899–905 (2008) (describing the PORTAL Alliance and its predecessors). These 
intermediaries handle transactions in buyout funds, etc., that dwarf the dollar amounts seen in 
venture capital fund transactions. 
 145. See infra notes 169–76 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of these 
status differences). 
 146. See Ross P. Buckley, The Transformative Potential of a Secondary Market: Emerging 
Markets Debt Trading from 1983 to 1989, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1152, 1162 (1998) (noting that a 
“central location for trading” is integral to the concept of a market). But see Macey & Kanda, 
supra note 78, at 1014 (arguing that market professionals rather than organized securities 
exchanges actually provide the economic benefits of market activity). 
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direct market funds, or those funds having to figure out which Twitter 
employees might be willing to sell, each simply visits Twitter’s 
bulletin-board page on the SharesPost website and directly posts its 
buy-sell bids.147 As electronic marketplaces, these intermediaries are 
harnessing the power of technology to facilitate secondary market 
growth.148 Once buyers and sellers are matched, the electronic 
marketplaces allow for efficient price discovery by posting recent buy-
sell bids and the latest contract price (SharesPost)149 and by providing 
third-party research reports on private start-ups (SharesPost and 
SecondMarket).150 The electronic marketplaces also significantly 
reduce transaction costs in papering deals by offering standardized 
sales contracts, e-signature options, and escrow services for 
transferring funds.151 For all of these reasons, SharesPost and 
 
 147. See Needleman, supra note 66 (noting that one of SharesPost’s value-added services is 
that it “connects buyers and sellers”). 
 148. See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 58 (1998) (“By reducing the search and information costs 
associated with small business capital formation, Internet technology offers new potential for 
small businesses to raise capital.”).  
 149. Better pricing information on private start-up stock has applications beyond direct 
market exits, including more reliable 409A valuations and FAS 157 calculations. See Sjostrom, 
supra note 59, at 434 (noting that NASDAQ’s PORTAL trading system “establish[es] a market 
price that a company could use as part of a phantom stock or other market-priced-based 
incentive compensation plan”). But start-up management may actually dislike greater 
transparency on common stock pricing, coupled with the lower discounts seen in the direct 
market, because it will make it more difficult to attract new employees with cheap stock options. 
It should be noted that data points are still few and far between for most start-ups listed on 
SharesPost, and transactions must become much more frequent to come close to resembling an 
efficient capital market on par with the NYSE. 
 150. See Brogger Interview, supra note 69 (interviewing SharesPost CEO Greg Brogger on 
SharesPost’s connections with third-party research analysts VC Experts and Next Up); 
Needleman, supra note 66 (“Since these private companies don’t have open, audited books where 
potential investors can study up on the companies, Sharespost collects analysts’ research on the 
companies in its market to help buyers and sellers agree on a value for shares being 
transacted.”); Press Release, SecondMarket, SecondMarket Ecosystem to Bring Transparency to 
Illiquid Assets (Mar. 26, 2009), available at https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/ 
pressreleases/secondmarket-ecosystem-to-bring-transparency-to-illiquid-assets (SecondMarket’s 
Ecosystem offers buyers and sellers free access to critical resources for trading illiquid assets, 
including valuation, research, data, analytics, legal and transaction advisory services). 
 151. See SharesPost Launches, supra note 75 (quoting SharesPost’s CEO Greg Brogger for 
the proposition that by “providing an automated contract process and integrating escrow 
services, SharesPost is the first company to bring true liquidity to the private equity market”); 
id. (“SharesPost offers its members a library of standardized agreements to contract and handle 
transaction restrictions such as rights of first result.”); SharesPost Overview, SHARESPOST, 
http://www.sharespost.com/pages/overview (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (“Follow simple step-by-step 
process for entering into contract with the buyer or seller. You can download contracts to 
implement your transaction to review with your attorney. Once you click to indicate you wish to 
execute a particular contract, our partner Echosign will email you a link to a page where you can 
electronically sign it.”). 
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SecondMarket now allow secondary transactions to “be closed for a 
fraction of the cost, time[,] and hassle of traditional secondary 
transactions.”152 
In terms of intangibles, one interviewee believes that the 
electronic exchanges will also grow VC secondary markets by 
“injecting trust” into the process for wary buyers and sellers. Although 
the fund market sees transactions between sophisticated institutions, 
direct market sellers are likely to be entrepreneurs and employees 
who do not regularly engage in these transactions and may be wary of 
being “taken.”153 By increasing transparency, the electronic 
marketplaces can induce more entrepreneurs and employees to 
participate. Further, while the electronic exchanges are much 
different than well-established stock exchanges, it has been observed 
that “[l]isting on an exchange can provide a valuable filter to 
investors, informing them that the securities listed are of high 
quality.”154 SharesPost already imposes some quality control 
limitations on the start-ups it will list,155 making it possible to imagine 
a future where listings on the electronic marketplaces can signal a 
start-up’s quality to potential buyers. 
B. Legal Impediments to Growth 
While electronic marketplaces should grow VC secondary 
markets, there exist certain securities laws, a particular tax law, and 
standard contracting practices in venture capital that provide a 
countervailing force against growth. This Section explores each of 
these potentially limiting factors. 
Resale Restrictions: Securities Laws. Because start-ups and 
venture capital funds are privately held entities, sales of their 
securities must be exempt from public registration by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Secondary market transactions 
are actually resales, since the primary distribution was from the 
entity (the start-up or venture capital fund) to the initial investor. 
When the initial investor sells to a new investor in the secondary 
market, a resale exemption must be found. Private resales of 
securities find a general exemption from registration under the so-
 
 152. SharesPost Launches, supra note 75. 
 153. One interviewee told me that the institutional culture of the fund market made it more 
difficult for electronic marketplaces to attract that business.  
 154. Macey & Kanda, supra note 78, at 1023. 
 155. See Garthwaite, supra note 68 (explaining that start-ups listed on SharesPost must 
have $100 million market capitalization, meaning that winning, later-stage start-ups are the 
ones likely to be listed). 
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called section 4(1-1/2) of the Securities Act of 1933.156 But because that 
section does not provide the concrete guidance that the parties will 
desire, they will often look to two safe harbor resale exemptions 
promulgated by the SEC: Rules 144 and 144A.157 These exemptions 
provide the parties with predictability, but that predictability comes 
at a cost; namely, there are several requirements in the exemptions 
that could butt up against market growth. 
First, Rules 144 and 144A limit the class of buyers and sellers. 
Rule 144A allows resales only to “qualified institutional buyers” 
(commonly known as “QIBs”), or institutions that own and invest on a 
discretionary basis at least $100 million in the securities of 
nonaffiliated entities.158 Thus, that exemption will only be available 
when selling to a large institution, such as a dedicated fund. 
Conversely, Rule 144 allows anyone to buy, but imposes a one-year 
holding period on sellers.159 According to my interviews, it is unlikely 
that start-up employees or LPs in venture capital funds will look to 
secondary markets for liquidity within the first year; however, the 
Rule contains an important qualification for stock options. Rule 144 
does not count the length of time that a stock option is held; rather, 
the holding period begins when the option is actually exercised.160 
Consequently, Rule 144 is not available to resell recently exercised 
stock options.161 Rule 144’s holding period may become more difficult 
to satisfy should secondary markets begin to see resales of resales. 
Currently, interviewees tell me that both direct and fund market 
resales are almost always “one and done,” meaning that the securities 
 
 156. See Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 19 SEC Docket 465, 496 
n.178 (Feb. 1, 1980) (acknowledging the existence of the Section 4 (1–1/2) exemption). 
 157. See Legal, SHARESPOST, http://www.sharespost.com/pages/legal (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011) (“[W]e believe we have constructed the SharesPost process such that Buyer and Seller can 
generally make use of a Section 4(1) exemption, and in some cases, Rule 144.”); Regulatory, 
NYPPEX PRIVATE MARKETS, http://www.nyppex.com/Webpages/regulatory.aspx (last visited Oct. 
6, 2011) (“NYPPEX relies upon the current interpretations by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Courts of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, Rule 144A, 
Rule 144, and Regulation D to conduct its private trading businesses.”). 
 158. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i) (2011) (defining “qualified institutional buyer”); id. 
§ 230.144A(d)(1) (requiring that securities be sold only to a QIB or to an entity the seller 
reasonably believes is a QIB). 
 159. Id. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii) (2011). The holding period is shortened to six months for exempt 
resales of reporting company securities. Id. § 230.144(d)(1)(i). 
 160. Mira Ganor, Improving the Legal Environment for Start-up Financing by Rationalizing 
Rule 144, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1447, 1449 n.11 (2007) (“In the case of options, the date the 
option is exercised, rather than the date the option is granted, marks the beginning of the 
holding period for the share issued pursuant to the option.”). 
 161. See Needleman, supra note 66 (on SharesPost, “only vested shares…can be traded”). 
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come to rest with the first secondary market buyer (until a traditional 
exit). 
Second, Rules 144 and 144A both require disclosure about the 
start-up or venture capital fund under certain circumstances.162 
Because these are private entities that receive no direct benefit from 
the resale, they may be reluctant to cooperate with the disclosure 
requirement. Venture capital funds are also notoriously secretive,163 
making cooperation an even greater hurdle in the fund market. Public 
companies are tasked with mandatory disclosure in part to overcome 
these limits on cooperation,164 but these rules do not apply to private 
entities. Thus, their cooperation will be required to permit secondary 
transactions in the situations that require disclosure. 
Finally, Rule 144 imposes two additional restrictions for sellers 
who are “affiliates” of the entity.165 Interviewees tell me that relatively 
few sellers will rise to the level of affiliates, but, for those that do, the 
additional strictures could limit secondary market growth. First, 
affiliates are subject to a limitation on the volume of securities that 
can be sold.166 This restriction is designed to ensure that large 
shareholders do not flood the market.167 Second, Rule 144 requires 
that affiliate sales be made through brokers’ transactions that 
comport with certain rules.168 
 
 162. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(2) (information requirements under Rule 144); id. § 
230.144A(d)(4) (disclosure requirements under Rule 144A); see also Sjostrom, supra note 59, at 
428 (discussing the disclosure requirement under Rule 144A). 
 163. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that VCs avoid certain investors 
so as not to trigger disclosure requirements). 
 164. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
26–30 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing justifications for mandatory disclosure). 
 165. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (“An affiliate of an issuer is a person that directly, or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control 
with, such issuer.”). 
 166. The maximum amount that a particular shareholder can sell over a three-month period 
is the greater of (a) one percent of the company’s outstanding shares, or (b) the average reported 
weekly trading volume of the company’s securities during the four previous weeks. Id. § 
230.144(e)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 167. See Ganor, supra note 160, at 1451 (criticizing the selling-volume limitation because it 
“allows each restricted shareholder to sell the same amount regardless of how many shares [he] 
owns. Thus, the last share purchased by an investor bears a much higher liquidity risk than the 
first share.”). 
 168. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f)(1) (requiring that securities be sold through either brokers’ 
transactions, transactions with a market maker, or a “riskless principal transaction”); see also 
SharesPost Partners with Independent Brokers to Enable Secondary Market Transactions, 
ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (Apr. 19, 2010), http://eon.businesswire.com/portal/site/eon/permalink/ 
?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20100419005727&newsLang=en. Alternatively, the 
transaction could occur directly with a market maker or in a “riskless principal transaction,” but 
neither of those avenues are currently available in the direct or fund markets. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.144(f)(1)(ii), (iii).  
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Securities Law Restrictions on Electronic Marketplaces. 
Securities laws do not just limit resale transactions, but they limit the 
operation of the electronic marketplaces themselves. Electronic 
marketplaces seek to avoid registering as formal “exchanges” like the 
NYSE or NASDAQ.169 The SEC has generally exempted electronic 
marketplaces such as SharesPost and SecondMarket from exchange 
status. SecondMarket takes advantage of SEC exemptions that allow 
electronic matching systems to register as broker-dealers instead of 
exchanges.170 SharesPost, on the other hand, avoids both exchange 
and broker-dealer registration through its structure as a passive 
bulletin board. To stay within the narrow bulletin-board exemption 
created by SEC No-Action Letters,171 SharesPost cannot advise buyers 
or sellers on the merits of any transaction or handle any funds 
(instead deferring that task to an escrow agent).172 Therefore, while 
SecondMarket collects a success fee of two percent per side per 
completed transaction,173 SharesPost can only charge a monthly fee 
(currently thirty-four dollars) to buyers and sellers, leaving its escrow 
agent to collect five-thousand dollars per transaction.174 One 
commentator calls it “bizarre” that SharesPost would not “go for a 
 
 169. For the definition of an exchange, see Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-
16(a). For reasons why electronic marketplaces would seek to avoid exchange status, see Andrew 
R. Thompson, Note, Taming the Frontier? An Evaluation of the SEC’s Regulation of Electronic 
Marketplaces, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 188: 
A decision to register as an exchange imposes upon the intermediary the cost of SRO 
functions (inter alia they must establish and enforce rules for their members), fair 
access provisions, and significant disclosure and transparency requirements. 
Additionally, a decision to register as an exchange requires a site to accept only 
registered broker/dealers as members, thereby eliminating the ability of an exchange to 
have institutional investors and individuals as members. 
(citation omitted). 
 170. See Fisch, supra note 148, at 72 (“More controversial are alternative trading systems 
that allow investors to bypass the exchanges through electronic matching systems and bulletin 
boards. Currently these systems are regulated, for the most part, as broker-dealers.”). 
 171. See id. (stating that the SEC has exempted the operators of bulletin boards from the 
regulatory requirements applicable to exchanges and broker-dealers); see also Internet Capital 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1104, at *5–8 (Dec. 22, 1997) (stating 
that the SEC will not seek enforcement against a bulletin board for failure to register as an 
exchange). 
 172. See Internet Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 171, at *9 (relying on the 
fact that a bulletin board would not “provide information regarding the advisability” of buying or 
selling stock in determining that the SEC would not seek enforcement for failure to register as 
an exchange); Needleman, supra note 66 (noting that U.S. Bank serves as escrow agent for 
SharesPost transactions). 
 173. Miller, supra note 51. 
 174. Needleman, supra note 66. 
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small piece of the action,”175 but its reason is to avoid the “transaction-
based compensation” that is evidence of broker-dealer status.176 In 
short, the electronic marketplaces must tread carefully and structure 
their business models accordingly to continue to operate outside of the 
SEC’s purview. 
Resale Restrictions: Tax Law. In addition to Rule 144’s limits 
on the volume that affiliates may resell in both the direct and fund 
markets, there is a particular tax law that imposes another volume 
restriction on the fund market. Specifically, section 7704 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, along with Treasury Regulation 1.7704 
promulgated thereunder, increases the tax burden on “publicly traded 
partnerships” (“PTPs”).177 Because this law applies to partnerships 
rather than to their individual investors, it is likely to play a greater 
role in limiting the ultimate size of the fund market. 
As limited partnerships, venture capital funds qualify for flow-
through taxation so long as they are not considered PTPs. PTPs, on 
the other hand, are double taxed under the corporate rules.178 Thus, 
VCs and their LPs will avoid PTP status and its extra layer of tax at 
all costs. There are two possible ways that a partnership can become a 
PTP: (1) when its interests are traded on an established securities 
market; or (2) when its interests are readily available on a secondary 
market.179 Venture capital funds are concerned with the secondary 
market rule, which applies if investors are able to buy and sell their 
fund interests in a manner that approximates the level of liquidity 
available to a shareholder on a public stock exchange. 
Two important safe harbors from PTP status help venture 
capital funds and their LPs stay within what the Internal Revenue 
Service deems to be an acceptable level of private market liquidity. 
The first safe harbor exists for funds with only a de minimis amount of 
their interests trading, defined as less than two percent of the total 
interest in partnership capital or profits during any taxable year.180 A 
second safe harbor exists for sales that are conducted through a 
 
 175. Id. (“Bizarrely, Sharespost does not collect a piece of these transactions. Brogger 
[SharesPost’s CEO] doesn’t want to make his company a brokerage.”). 
 176. See Birchtree Fin. Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 652137, at *1 (Sept. 22, 
1998) (“The Division has taken the position that the receipt of securities commissions or other 
transaction related compensation is a key factor in determining whether a person or an entity is 
acting as a broker-dealer.”). 
  177. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704(a) (2006) (treating PTPs as corporations); id. § 7704(g)(3) 
(imposing 3.5% tax on the gross income of certain PTPs); 26 C.F.R. § 1.7704 (2011) (interpreting 
26 U.S.C. § 7704). 
 178. See 26 U.S.C. § 7704(a) (treating PTPs as corporations). 
 179. Id. § 7704(b)(1)–(2); 26 C.F.R. § 1.7704-1(a) (2011). 
 180. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7704-1(j) (excluding otherwise-exempt transfers). 
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“qualified matching service” (“QMS”). The QMS safe harbor allows for 
a five-fold increase in volume, or up to ten percent of the fund trading 
in a taxable year.181 Due to the increased activity allowed under the 
QMS safe harbor, SecondMarket has qualified as a QMS for its 
members.182 
Resale Restrictions: Standard Contracting Practices. Additional 
limits on VC secondary market growth may be self-imposed. We saw 
that start-ups and venture capital funds may not wish to provide the 
disclosure that is sometimes required by Rules 144 and 144A.183 These 
entities also have certain standard contracting practices that may 
hinder secondary market growth. In the direct market, stock option 
grants to start-up employees typically include rights of first refusal 
(“ROFR”) in favor of the company, according to my interviewees. 
Start-up management might include a ROFR provision out of concern 
that unfettered secondary sales to a large number of buyers will cause 
the start-up to surpass five-hundred shareholders and thus become 
subject to reporting requirements as a public company.184 Although it 
is unlikely that start-ups will spend their limited cash on share 
repurchases, the inclusion of a ROFR in an option grant can delay or 
deter sales to direct market buyers.185 
In the fund market, VCs typically reserve the right to refuse 
sales of LP interests in their limited partnership agreements.186 There 
are several reasons why VCs might be reluctant to approve fund 
market sales. First, there is the concern that too many LPs may 
attempt to trade and lead the fund to PTP status. Second, while direct 
market sales do not seem to come with any stigma to the start-up, as 
 
 181. Id. § 1.7704-1(g). 
 182.  Daniel Hausmann, SecondMarket Launches QMS Practice, DOW JONES LBO WIRE, Feb. 
27, 2009, available at https://www.fis.dowjones.com/article.aspx?aid=DJFLBO0020090224e52 
p001e1&r=wsjblog&s=djflbo&ProductIDFromApplication=15. NYPPEX has also qualified as a 
QMS for its members. See Our Company, NYPPEX, http://nyppex.com/company.php# (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2011) (listing QMS as a service NYPPEX provides). 
 183. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 184. Companies with more than 500 shareholders and whose total assets exceed $10 million 
must register the securities under the Exchange Act and thereby come under the periodic 
reporting requirements of Section 13(a). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 13, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78o (2006); see also id. § 12(f)(1) (raising the asset requirement to $ 10 
million). On the contrary, employee sales to dedicated funds such as Industry Ventures or 
Millennium may serve to reduce the number of shareholders and streamline the start-up’s 
capital structure.  
 185. See David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 5 
(1999) (“Rights of first refusal discourage potentially high-valuing third-party bidders from 
entering a contest to purchase . . . .”). 
 186. See Ross et al., supra note 134 (“[G]eneral partners must consent to a transfer of equity 
interests from the seller to the buyer . . . .”). 
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leading start-ups are being sold, VCs may worry that fund market 
sales at steep discounts might signal dissatisfaction with VCs’ 
performance. Third, certain LPs will be subject to disclosure 
requirements about their investment performance, and VCs typically 
will avoid having those LPs as investors in their funds.187 Fourth, for 
VCs, fund market sales create administrative hassle with little payoff. 
In the past, new LPs would also commit to a given VC’s next fund, 
providing some upside to the substitution for VCs. But these “stapled” 
transactions have now “all but vanished from the market.”188 Finally, 
one interviewee claims that VCs are “allergic” to robust fund market 
trading because they fear it will find its way onto the SEC’s radar 
screen. VCs lobby heavily to avoid having additional SEC rules apply 
to them. In sum, VCs may refuse fund market sales for any of these 
reasons, and doing so will limit fund market growth. 
Reasons for the SEC to Limit VC Secondary Markets. How the 
SEC will look upon the further development of VC secondary markets 
is an open question. On the one hand, should a wider class of buyers 
participate in these markets, especially noninstitutional buyers, the 
SEC would have a legitimate interest in protecting those investors. As 
Jill Fisch observes, “Companies with small capitalizations present 
disproportionate risks of both business failure and fraud. These risks 
may be magnified by Internet-based securities transactions.”189 
Similarly, Donald Langevoort notes that “investment frauds have 
always been, and will always be, heavily concentrated among new and 
unfamiliar ventures.”190 Most start-ups fail, and the venture capital 
model depends on a portfolio strategy to compensate for those losses. 
Will individual direct market buyers sufficiently diversify, or will they 
put too much weight on the glitz of hot names that may be less-than-
sound in their revenue models? Importantly, are the limited 
information and data offered on a website like SharesPost giving 
novice investors a false sense of security that they too can invest in 
this extremely difficult-to-predict sector? Perhaps the large funds who 
 
 187. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 
738, 738 n.88 (stating that venture capital funds will try to avoid accepting public investment).  
 188. Players or Opportunistic Investors?, supra note 125. 
 189. Fisch, supra note 148, at 58. 
 190. Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological 
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 
(1998) (citation omitted) (“The realization that investment frauds have always been, and will 
always be, heavily concentrated among new and unfamiliar ventures operates as a strong 
counterweight to the deregulatory impulse.”); Needleman, supra note 66 (“I still fear that people 
could get taken in this [direct] market due to the relative lack of oversight and control compared 
with public market . . . .”). 
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buy in VC secondary markets are the only ones with adequate skill, 
expertise, and time to fully investigate and select/price transactions. 
Although the investor protection rationale is certainly 
legitimate in this context, Langevoort suggests that the SEC may also 
limit private market growth for public choice reasons. He observes 
that private market growth depends on whether the SEC “is willing to 
permit the kind of threat to the role of organized exchanges that a 
deep and liquid market for private securities would pose.”191 As an 
example, Langevoort is puzzled by the persistence of the ban on 
general solicitations in private placements, including resales under 
Rule 144A.192 He suggests that the SEC may adhere to that ban 
despite heavy criticism because without it, private “market[s] would 
come to dominate the public ones, freezing non-accredited investors 
out of direct participation (with the inevitable reduction in the SEC’s 
own claim to resources).”193 
CONCLUSION 
Investors can readily buy shares in publicly traded companies, 
but, until recently, they have been unable to own a piece of private 
start-ups like Facebook or Twitter without working there or investing 
in exclusive venture capital funds. Now that venture capital has 
become a $400 billion worldwide asset class,194 however, start-up stock 
and LP interests in venture capital funds have begun trading in 
private secondary markets. Venture capital is the latest in a long line 
of asset classes for which secondary markets have developed.195 
Secondary markets offer initial investors a new path to liquidity, offer 
 
 191. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet, supra note 190, at 11; see also David D. Haddock & 
Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to 
Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987) (applying a public choice model to the 
SEC’s insider trading rules and enforcement); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: 
Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 527, 529–30 (1990) [hereinafter Langevoort, SEC as a Bureaucracy] (framing public choice 
broadly as not only actions that serve the external interests of some constituency, but also “self-
serving institutional” actions). 
 192. See Langevoort, SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 191, at 531 (discussing the SEC’s 
“niggardly approach” to developing safe harbor rules); Sjostrom, supra note 59, at 445 (“While 
Rule 144A does not expressly prohibit general solicitation, practitioners have long held the view 
that it is nonetheless disallowed under the rule . . . .”). 
 193. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet, supra note 190, at 25 (citation omitted). 
 194. Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 4.  
 195. Other secondary markets have emerged for assets including insurance policies, home 
mortgages, and distressed debt. See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a 
Secondary Market in Life Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 449 (2003), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=387321.  
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buyers access to a previously untapped class of assets, and produce 
governance benefits for traded firms. The realization of these benefits 
in venture capital should lead to a net increase in the total amount of 
entrepreneurial activity. Given the surplus that entrepreneurial 
activity produces for society, VC secondary markets should be studied 
by academics and encouraged by policymakers. This Article is the first 
to study VC secondary markets and the issues they implicate in law 
and economics analysis. The law and lawyers will play an important 
role in shaping these markets. As this Article has revealed, certain 
securities and tax laws may impede secondary market growth, and 
carve-outs for this activity should be considered by policymakers. 
Until such carve-outs might come to pass, however, lawyers will play a 
prominent role in navigating the current legal framework for 
secondary market sales. As one large secondary buyer observes, 
“Given that potentially significant corporate and securities law issues 
can arise in situations where restricted securities in private 
companies are bought, sold, or transferred, we expect the role of legal 
advisors with expertise on the issues of the secondary marketplace to 
grow considerably in the next few years.”196 As a result, lawyers who 
can acquire transactional and regulatory expertise in this area will 
become increasingly valuable in Silicon Valley and beyond. 
 
 196. Burstein & Schwerin, supra note 49, at 9. 
